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PATIENTS AS CONSUMERS:




The persistent riddle of health-care policy is how to control the
costs while improving the quality of care. The riddle's once-
promising answer-managed care-has been politically ravaged,
and consumerist solutions are now winning favor This Article ex-
amines the legal condition of the patient-as-consumer in today's
health-care market. It finds that insurers bargain with some success
for rates for the people they insure. The uninsured, however, must
contract to pay whatever a provider charges and then are regularly
charged prices that are several times insurers'prices and providers'
actual costs. Perhaps because they do not understand the health-
care market, courts generally enforce these contracts. This Article
proposes legal solutions to the plight of the patient-as-consumer
and asks what that plight tells us about market solutions to the
health-care quandary.
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[Professionals] may, as in the case of a successful doctor grow rich; but
the meaning of their profession, both for themselves and for the public, is
not that they make money but that they make health, or safety, or knowl-
edge, or good government or good law ..... [Professions uphold] as the
criterion of success the end for which the profession, whatever it may be, is
carried on, and [subordinate] the inclination, appetites and ambition of
individuals to the rules of an organization which has as its object to pro-
mote the performance offunction.
-R. H. Tawney
The Acquisitive Society
INTRODUCTION: PATIENTS AS CONSUMERS IN A NEW MARKETPLACE
Patients have always been consumers.' Before health insurance was
common, they shopped in a market for medical services just as they shopped
in a market for toasters and tailors. The fifteen percent of us who lack health
insurance still shop that way. Even insured patients shop: they make copay-
ments and have coinsurance; they pay extra for doctors and hospitals outside
the insurer's network and for drugs outside the insurer's formulary.2
Patients have always been consumers, but, today, America's battle to re-
strain rocketing costs of health care has transformed the world of patients as
consumers: Crucially, two recent reforms have (1) pushed more patients into
the medical market and (2) made that market a more parlous place.
In one of those reforms-managed care-insurers bargain with doctors
and hospitals and give providers incentives to cabin costs. This helps plan
members get care less expensively, which is its intent. Unintentionally, how-
l. See generally Nancy Tomes, Patients or Health-Care Consumers?, in HISTORY AND
HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 83 (Rosemary A. Stevens et al. eds., 2006).
2. See generally Dahlia K. Remler & Sherry A. Glied, How Much More Cost Sharing Will
Health Savings Accounts Bring?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1070 (2006); James C. Robinson, Renewed Em-
phasis on Consumer Cost Sharing in Health Insurance Benefit Design, 2002 HEALTH AFF. W139,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.1 39v I (web exclusive).
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ever, managed care relegates uninsured patients to a new marketplace, a
marketplace of uncommon harshness dominated by doctors, hospitals, and
insurers. Briefly, insurers aggressively negotiate rates for plan members;
uninsured patients must "bargain" individually with providers who are de-
termined to recoup what they bargained away to insurers.
Managed care, then, has momentously changed the market for patients
who must be consumers. The latest reform-consumer-directed health
care-drives more insured patients into that market.3 Assisted by a new tax
shelter for "health savings accounts," employers and individuals are buying
insurance with high deductibles that require patients to pay most medical
costs out of pocket. To qualify for the tax shelter, deductibles may range
from $1,100 for individuals to $11,000 for families.' This is supposed to
induce patients to shop like consumers for good care at low prices. 6
What happens when patients buy care in the new medical market? What
happens when consumer-directed health care makes even insured patients
negotiate prices with doctors and hospitals? The standard hope is that the
market will provide, that the market will spread decent products at reason-
able prices before consumers, who will choose the right goods at the right
rates. The key but unappreciated fact, however, is that the market for unin-
sured medical services is a calamity. Patients can rarely amass enough
information about services and prices to make good decisions about hiring
doctors and buying care. Patients are frequently committed to their doctors,
and their doctors normally decide which hospitals to use. Doctors and hospi-
tals commonly require patients to sign contracts obliging them to pay
whatever bills the provider cares to present. Providers regularly present and
aggressively collect staggering bills unrelated to their costs or to the prices
they negotiate with insurers. This is a market few can negotiate wisely, but
in which missteps can destroy patients economically. No surprise, then, that
3. See generally TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE
CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT (2007); Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership
Society Health Care Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777, 803-05 (2006).
4. A deductible of $3,500, for instance, covers all the annual medical expenses for about
eighty percent of people. See John V. Jacobi, Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically
Ill, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 531, 562 (2005); Paul Fronstin, Health Savings Accounts and Other
Account-Based Health Plans, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF, Sept. 2004, at 1, 1I, available
at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0904ibl.pdf; Mark W. Stanton, The High Concentration of U.S.
Health Care Expenditures, AHRQ RES. ACTION, June 2006, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/
research/rial 9/expendria.pdf.
5. Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 2007 HSA Indexed Amounts,
http://www.treas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/071ndexedAmounts.shtm (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
6. Patients are simultaneously encouraged to be consumers by other developments. For
example, some physicians are establishing cash-only practices that refuse insurance. See Sandra J.
Carnahan, Law, Medicine, and Wealth. Does Concierge Medicine Promote Health Care Choice, or
is it a Barrier to Access?, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 101 (2006); Frank Pasquale, The Three Faces
of Retainer Care: Crafting a Tailored Regulatory Response, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS
39, 50 (2007). Also, retail chains are opening clinics offering basic services for everyday ailments.
See MARY KATE SCOTT, HEALTH CARE IN THE EXPRESS LANE: THE EMERGENCE OF RETAIL
CLINICS (Cal. HealthCare Found. 2006), available at http://www.chcf.org/documents/policy/
HealthCarelnTheExpressLaneRetailClinics.pdf; Ranit Mishori, Is "Quick" Enough? Store Clinics
Tap a Public Need, but Many Doctors Call the Care Inferior, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2007, at FI.
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the costs of illness-particularly medical bills-contribute to more than half
of the personal bankruptcies in the United States.7
What should the law do when patients become consumers in this harsh
market? Most basically, should patients be treated like any other consumers,
and providers like any other vendors? More specifically, how should the law
superintend the negotiation of contracts to pay for medical services? Should
the law limit those contracts substantively? Do courts have a repertoire of
doctrines for ameliorating the market's failure or at least safeguarding pa-
tients in extreme cases? If not, can doctrines be developed to make the
worlds of managed care and consumer-directed health care safer for pa-
tients?
Scholars have strangely neglected these questions. Lawmakers have not
recognized their existence, dimensions, or urgency. This is understandable,
for lawmakers must rely on scholars to keep up with the medical markets'
rapid changes. But while medical markets have been well studied, scholars
have virtually ignored the legal questions the new market presents.'
We do not imagine that courts can solve the problems of health-care fi-
nance. But we believe that courts can and should shield patients from the
cruelest consequences of the new market. Sickness, fear, and ignorance
make patients inherently vulnerable. When patients must be consumers,
their vulnerability deepens as they find themselves trapped in a market that
starves them of information, alternatives, and leverage, a market that pre-
cludes prudent choice. The law ordinarily safeguards vulnerable consumers
in perilous markets, and it eagerly protects patients when they choose medi-
cal treatments. More specifically, the common law endows courts with
several doctrines that speak to the problems of patients as consumers. The
law should recruit and develop these doctrines to shelter patients in the mar-
ket managed care has created and consumer-directed health care will depend
on.
7. Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient Revisited, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 307, 313 (2007);
Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An Alternative Account of
Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 535, 548 (2006); Robert W. Seifert & Mark
Rukavina, Bankruptcy is the lip of a Medical-Debt Iceberg, 25 HEALTH AFF. W89 (2006),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/2/w89 (web exclusive).
8. The first modem scholarship to address these issues appeared in 2006. E.g., Mark A.
Hall, Paying for What You Get and Getting What You Pay for: Legal Responses to Consumer-Driven
Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 159; Jacoby & Warren, supra note 7;
E. Haavi Morreim, High-Deductible Health Plans: New Twists on Old Challenges from Tort and
Contract, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (2006); George A. Nation IH, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of
Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 Ky. L.J. 101 (2006). For an example of
legal scholarship from over a century ago, see JOHN ORDRONAUX, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MEDI-
CINE IN ITS RELATIONS TO THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, TORTS, AND EVIDENCE 1-93 (1869). Almost
nothing appears in between.
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I. THE MISERABLE MARKET FOR MEDICAL FEES
A. Introduction to the Problem of the Medical Marketplace
Patients increasingly are consumers. Consumers buy from vendors with
interests of their own. Consumers must make well-judged purchases in the
market-must evaluate their needs, assess their alternatives, hunt for the
best price, and pay the consequent bill. In their rapture for deploying pa-
tients to tame medical costs, proponents of consumer-directed health care
have descanted on the virtues of markets. But even smart and energetic con-
sumers can struggle, even in good markets. How well can patients manage
in the medical market?
For consumers to evaluate prices, they must know them. Here the prob-
lems begin: "Medicine is the one capitalist enterprise to reveal its price tag
only after the purchase or transaction is completed."9 When patients ap-
proach a doctor or hospital, they almost never know and can rarely discover
what things will cost. Few contracts with doctors and hospitals specify
prices. Sometimes there is no contract; the obligation to pay is implied. Phy-
sicians' agreements usually refer delphically to "fees," "payments,"
"accounts," or "balances."' Likewise, hospital-admission forms obscurely
commit patients to paying all "charges" not covered by insurance." In short,
doctors and hospitals insist that patients accept their standard charges, and
patients learn what they bought and what it cost only on receiving a bill (if
they are marvelously lucky and receive a bill they can understand).
Should courts enforce onerous bills contracted in this lamentable way?
If the market otherwise functions decently, perhaps." But the health-care
9. Howard F Stein, The Money Taboo in American Medicine, MED. ANTHROPOLOGY, Fall
1983, at 1, 11 (emphasis omitted).
10. We verified this common knowledge (available to all who notice what they sign when
they go to the doctor) through the most casual of empiricism. One morning in 2006 after one of us
had his teeth cleaned, he visited the eight doctors' offices in the vicinity to collect forms patients
sign regarding financial responsibility. This "convenience sample" included offices with one to four
physicians covering the following areas of practice: internal medicine, pediatrics, gynecology, neu-
rology, general surgery, and cosmetic surgery. Only the cosmetic surgeon used a form that allowed a
price to be stated. Others referred generically to "charges," "fees," "payments," "account" or "bal-
ance" not paid by insurance. Most of the forms explicitly made the patient responsible for payment,
but two left the obligation implicit. Usually, these forms are completed on the patient's first office
visit. Only one office had such contractual language on an "encounter form" that patients sign each
visit.
11. See, e.g., DiCarlo v. St. Mary's Hosp., No. 05-1665, 2006 WL 2038498, at *1 (D.N.J.
July 19, 2006) (enforcing a hospital contract that stated only that patients must pay "all charges");
Cox v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 631 S.E.2d 792, 796 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) ("[T]he contract ...
simply provides that the patients will pay 'in accordance with the rates and terms of the hospital.' ");
Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Tenn. 2001) ("As part of the hospi-
tal's pre-admission process, Jane Doe signed a hospital form.., which read in part as follows: ... I
understand I am financially responsible to the hospital for charges not covered by [insur-
ance].")(emphasis omitted)).
12. See Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 512 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) ("While it is
unlikely that a court would find a price set by a freely competitive market to be unconscionable ....
the market price set by an oligopoly should not be immune from scrutiny." (citation omitted)); Frank
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market is neither fair nor efficient. Rather, it is littered with the dangers of
which Professor Eisenberg warns:
[A] market that involves a monopoly sets the stage for the exploitation of
distress; a market in which transactions are complex and differentiated
rather than simple and homogeneous sets the stage for the exploitation of
transactional incapacity; a market in which actors do not simply take a
price established by a general market and are susceptible to transient eco-
nomic irrationality sets the stage for unfair persuasion; a market that
involves imperfect price-information sets the stage for the exploitation of
price-ignorance."
Lawmakers know little about the strange medical market and thus leave
patients to flounder in it. In this Part, therefore, we will chart the market's
operation and its consequences. In the next Part, we will ask how the law
should succor patients tossed in such stormy seas.
B. Insurers as Purchasers of Health Care
In one large part, the health-care market works plausibly enough. Insur-
ers (public and private) negotiate prices for much of the care many patients
receive. Insurers bargain from strength and can sell more insurance if they
offer the low rates that come with low fees. 4 And while patients pay what
insurers don't reimburse, insurers usually secure for the insured the same
discounts they negotiate for themselves." Insurers thus eliminate real con-
troversy16 over whether negotiated prices are reasonable in contract or
P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1819 (1994) (showing that courts
are more likely to find unconscionable price when market imperfections are greater).
13. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 799
(1982) (arguing for greater judicial scrutiny of prices when markets are not competitive).
14. Indeed, physicians often complain that these forces work too well and have sought spe-
cial protection under antitrust laws to negotiate collectively with insurers. See, e.g., William S.
Brewbaker, Physician Unions and the Future of Competition in the Health Care Sector, 33 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 545 (2000); Martin Gaynor, Why Don't Courts Treat Hospitals Like Tanks for Lique-
fied Gases? Some Reflections on Health Care Antitrust Enforcement, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
497, 505 (2006). Most economists, however, do not think insurers' market strength excessive. See,
e.g., Roger Feldman & Douglas Wholey, Do HMOs Have Monopsony Power?, I INT'L J. HEALTH
CARE FIN. ECON. 7 (2001); Gaynor, supra, at 507. Likewise, hospitals' ability to negotiate higher
rates with private insurers to make up shortfalls from government programs indicates that they are
not overwhelmed by private insurers. See Allen Dobson et al., The Cost-Shift Payment "Hydraulic":
Foundation, History, and Implications, 25 HEALTH AFF. 22 (2006) (documenting the extent of hos-
pitals' ability to increase rates paid by private insurers); Paul B. Ginsburg, Can Hospitals and
Physicians Shift the Effects of Cuts in Medicare Reimbursement to Private Payors?, 2003 HEALTH
AFF. W3-472, W3-475, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.472vl (web exclusive)
(analyzing providers' market power in view of their ability to shift costs to private insurers).
15. See Jerry Cromwell & Philip Burstein, Physician Losses from Medicare and Medicaid
Discounts: How Real Are They?, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 51, 55 (1985); Mark A. Hall & Clark C.
Havighurst, Reviving Managed Care with Health Savings Accounts, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1490, 1496
(2005).
16. However, it will not always be clear whether a service is covered by a plan and therefore
whether the plan's discount or payment rules apply. For instance, if a patient exceeds the maximum
amount a policy covers, it may be unclear whether further treatment that normally would be covered
remains subject to the policy's terms.
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common-law terms 7 : although insurance markets are hardly perfect (and so
perhaps should be regulated), they discourage nastily excessive fees in pro-
totypical situations.'
Nevertheless, no insurance covers everything, so even insured patients
can be vulnerable when medical care is not covered by insurance or when
care is sought outside a provider network. Insurance usually excludes treat-
ment that is experimental, cosmetic, custodial, or otherwise not "medically
necessary," and it often excludes or restricts other kinds of care, like treat-
ment for pre-existing conditions or for mental illness and treatment using
"alternative" therapies.' 9 Insurers' negotiated prices do not apply to these.
And insurers' discounts are not assured where the policy's coverage limits
are exceeded, even for necessary care.20
C. Shopping for Prices
Nobody knows how often patients pay nondiscounted fees,2' but such
fees account for virtually all the caselaw we have surveyed over patients'
bills.22 To resolve these disputes intelligently, courts must understand how
17. One exception might be so-called discount-only plans that provide no insurance protec-
tion but simply sell individual patients access to negotiated rates. See Gerard Britton, Discount
Medical Plans and the Consumer: Health Care in a Regulatory Blindspot, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L.
REV. 97, 111-12 (2004). However, because these surrogate fee schedules are not necessarily negoti-
ated at arm's length by someone with a clear stake in obtaining the lowest rates, they too might be
inflated.
18. This is true even when the insurer is only a third-party administrator for a self-insured
employer because insurers give these employers the same discounts insurers negotiate to reduce
their own financial liability. Cf Janice S. Lawlor & Mark A. Hall, Do Employers Voluntarily Include
Patient Protections in Self-Insured Managed Care Plans?, MANAGED CARE INTERFACE, Jan. 2005,
at 76.
19. Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers'Assessment of Medical Necessity,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992).
20. For discussions on caps on insurance coverage, see Jon Gabel et al., Individual Insur-
ance: How Much Financial Protection Does It Provide?, 2002 HEALTH AFF. W172,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.172v I (web exclusive), Sherry Glied et al.,
Bare-Bones Health Plans: Are They Worth the Money?, COMMONWEALTH FUND, May 2002, avail-
able at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr-doc/glied-barebones_518.pdf.
21. Some evidence: About 10%-20% of health insurance claims come from providers out-
side the primary network. Karl Huff, White Space Management of Health Care Claims: Maximizing
Savings from Non-Network Exposure, AHIP COVERAGE, July-Aug. 2005, at 37, 37. And people with
health insurance pay out of pocket for about 25% of physicians' costs, 15% of emergency room
costs, and 5% of hospitalization costs. See Erika C. Ziller et al., Out-of-Pocket Health Spending and
the Rural Underinsured, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1688, 1691 ex.1 (2006); KAISER FAMILY FOUND., DISTRI-
BUTION OF OUT-OF-POCKET SPENDING FOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES (2006), http://www.kff.org/
insurance/snapshot/chcm050206oth.cfm (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
22. See infra notes 240-244. Most of these cases involve patients without insurance, but in
the following cases the reasonableness of charges was challenged even though the patients had some
type of health insurance: Valley Hospital v. Kroll, 847 A.2d 636, 638 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2003); Temple Univiversity Hospital v. Healthcare Management Alternatives, Inc., 832 A.2d 501,
508-09 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Eagle v. Snyder, 604 A.2d 253, 253-54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Doe v.
HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191 (Tenn. 2001); River Park Hospital, Inc. v.
BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 43, 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); H.E. Butt Gro-




uninsured services are priced. Patients, doctors, hospitals, illnesses, and
treatments vary so enormously that generalizing about medical pricing is a
fools' game. But play it we must. Our generalization: the patient's illness,
the patient's relationship with the physician, and the patient's disadvantages
in selecting physicians combine to make it miserably difficult for patients to
shop skillfully for fair prices.
1. The Effects of Illness on the Patient as Consumer
Being a consumer is harder than it looks, especially when buying unfa-
miliar things in unfamiliar situations. Consumers chronically inform
themselves laxly, understand their preferences hazily, and analyze their
choices carelessly. An extensive and expanding law of consumer protection
responds to these frailties with a varied array of doctrines. 23 For example,
that law forbids unduly dangerous and even unduly disadvantageous sales-
as usury laws do. It relieves people of some improvident contracts, if only
through a locus poenitentiae. It requires warnings about many products-
truth-in-lending laws being a prime example (of this popular if bootless
technique). It provides remedies for harms done by defective products.
What, then, of the patient as consumer? All the consumer's frailties and
frustrations afflict the patient. But in addition, illness can cripple the patient
as consumer. How?
Illness disables. Sick bodies rebel, and the ill are defeated.
Illness pains. The faltering body hurts. Sometimes intensely; sometimes
perpetually. Even "a little loss of animal toughness, a little irritable weak-
ness and descent of the pain-threshold, will bring the worm at the core of all
our usual springs of delight into full view, and turn us into melancholy
metaphysicians. 24
Illness exhausts. The sick lose the physical strength and emotional forti-
tude to keep houses clean, families cared for, friendships alive, and
employers satisfied. They struggle even to rise from bed, brush their teeth,
or make breakfast.
Illness erodes control. One doctor explains that the most destructive part
of illness is "the loss of control. Maintaining control over oneself is so vital
to all of us that one might see all the other phenomena of illness as doing
harm... doubly ... as they reinforce the sick person's perception that he is
no longer in control. 25 Control is always an illusion; call no man happy un-
til he dies. But control especially eludes the ill.
23. See generally AM. BAR Ass'N, THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDE TO CONSUMER
LAW (1997), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/practical/books/consumer/home.html;
ANDREW L. SANDLER ET AL., CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES (2006); JONATHAN SHELDON &
CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (6th ed. 2004).
24. WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 140 (rev. reprint 1902).
25. ERIC J. CASSELL, THE HEALER'S ART 44 (1976).
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Illness enforces dependence. Everyone is dependent, but illness reduces
the sick to uncustomary and even plenary reliance on others. Arthur Frank
learned from his cancer that "[d]ependence is the primary fact of illness. 26
Illness disorients. Sickness alters lives, often globally, often incompre-
hensibly: "The merest schoolgirl, when she falls in love, has Shakespeare or
Keats to speak her mind for her; but let a sufferer try to describe a pain in
his head to a doctor and language at once runs dry."27 So the sick suffer a
disturbing, exhausting strangeness.
Illness baffles. Patients yearn to know their prognosis but rarely under-
stand the origin, mechanism, or trajectory of a disease. Worse, medicine "is
engulfed and infiltrated by uncertainty.
28
Illness terrifies. "I break out in a hot sweat, become dizzy with the secret
but powerful secretion of adrenaline, my mind boils with disparate thoughts
as the world transforms itself into an elaborate disaster.' 29 And "mere expla-
nations of course provide no relief, because all I now know is that I am
deeply and irrevocably out of my mind., 30 The sick fear all the harms we
have catalogued, and not least the lesser ones. When Arthur Frank talks "to
people about to begin chemotherapy, a common reaction is for fears of im-
mediate side-effects, particularly hair loss, to be more of a topic than fears
of the treatment not working. '3' But the ill fear much beyond these homely
horrors: And I looked, and behold a pale horse: and his name that sat on him
was Death.
Illness isolates. The pain, debility, uncertainty, and fear that those
around him do not know, their sufferer cannot fully share. Illness is "always
a place where there's no company, where nobody can follow."32
Who, so beset, can muster the energy and acuity to buy a telephone sen-
sibly, much less medical care? How can patients be the consumer a market
needs?
Someone who is ill and seeking help--unlike someonewho is purchasing a
pair of socks or a pound of sausages-is often vulnerable, certainly wor-
ried, sometimes uncomfortable, and frequently frightened. [The term
c]ustomer, like the other obvious choices-clients, consumers, and users-
erases something that lies at the heart of medicine: compassion and a rela-
tionship of trust."
26. ARTHUR W. FRANK, AT THE WILL OF THE BODY 112(1991).
27. VIRGINIA WOOLF, On Being Ill, in THE MOMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 15, 15 (uniform
ed., Hogarth Press 1952) (1947).
28. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 166 (1984).
29. ROBERT JON PENSACK & DWIGHT ARNAN WILLIAMS, RAISING LAZARUS 122-23 (1994).
30. Id.
31. ARTHUR W. FRANK, THE WOUNDED STORYTELLER: BODY, ILLNESS, AND ETHICS 45
(1995).
32. FLANNERY O'CONNOR, THE HABIT OF BEING 163 (1979).
33. Raymond Tallis, Commentary: Leave Well Alone, 318 BRIT. MED. J. 1756, 1757 (1999);
see also Judith H. Hibbard & Edward C. Weeks, Consumerism in Health Care: Prevalence and Predic-
tors, 25 MED. CARE 1019 (1987) (questioning whether patients are willing to act as consumers);
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2. Shopping for Treatments: Patients in the Hands of Doctors
Not only can illness cripple the patient as seeker of information and
maker of decisions, but the sick must engage with doctors in ways that unfit
them for the market. Patients rely so much on their doctors that their pur-
chasing choices are severly constricted, so constricted that it is hardly too
much to say that doctors wield something like monopoly power over pa-
tients.
We just described what illness can do to patients. In their weakness, in
their vulnerability, in their fear, patients crave the solace of doctors, confide
themselves to doctors, trust doctors. 4 Patients want a therapeutic relation-
ship with their doctors, a relationship which produces and prospers on
reliance, attachment, and mutual confidence. This generates what econo-
mists call "monopolistic competition."3 5 It generates a system that is
"inherently monopolistic."3 6 Patients rarely abandon doctors, reject doctors'
recommendations, or demand second opinions.37 So, as one court recog-
nized,
[t]he doctor dictates what brand [of drugs] the patient is to buy ... [and]
orders the amount of drugs and prescribes the quantity to be consumed. In
other words, the patient is a captive consumer. There is no other profession
or business where a member thereof can dictate to a consumer what brand
he must buy, what amount he must buy, and how fast he must consume it
and how much he must pay with the further condition to the consumer that
any failure to fully comply must be at the risk of his own health.... [T]he
patient then becomes a totally captive consumer and the doctor has a com-
plete monopoly."8
Why? The patient's bond with the doctor is not easily created nor lightly
sacrificed. Doctor and patient develop information about and confidence in
Deborah Lupton et al., Caveat Emptor or Blissful Ignorance? Patients and the Consumerist Ethos,
33 Soc. SCI. MED. 559, 567 (1991) (critiquing the attempt to convert patients to medical consumers
as inconsistent with "universal cultural beliefs in developed capitalist societies" about the desired
relationship to physicians); Wendy K. Mariner, Standards of Care and Standard Form Contracts:
Distinguishing Patient Rights and Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 1 (1998) (outlining differences between patients and medical consumers).
34. See generally Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002).
35. For a review of the economic literature, see PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOM-
ics 253-54 (5th ed. 1998). Feldstein notes that "[flhe physician services market is believed to be
characteristic of 'monopolistic competition' both because of the large number of competitors within
a market and because each physician has a somewhat differentiated service, thereby providing ...
physician[s] with" some power to increase their prices without losing a lot of business. Id.; see also
Thomas G. McGuire, Physician Agency, in IA HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 461, 475 (An-
thony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000) ("In virtually all characterizations of physicians
in economics journals and textbooks, the physician is portrayed as having some market power. Mo-
nopolistic competition ... is the expressed favorite [characterization] of many writers.").
36. See Joseph P. Newhouse, A Model of Physician Pricing, 37 S. ECON. J. 174, 175, 182
(1970) ("[E]ach physician can act like a monopolist toward those patients who choose to use him.").
37. CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL
DECISIONS (1998).
38. Magan Med. Clinic v. Cal. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256, 263 (Ct. App.
1967). Haavi Morreim called our attention to this decision in Morreim, supra note 8, at 1236.
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each other, information and confidence that must laboriously be re-created
when the patient changes doctors. This is not unique to medicine, 9 but ill-
ness inspires especially "thick" and vital personal relationships that patients
hate to disturb. In short, there "is a very powerful and special bond between
doctor and patient," so even "when a transaction does not directly involve a
physician financially," the doctor still plays "a dominant role."'  Doctors'
"monopoly" power is intensified by patients' almost irredeemable ignorance
about almost all of almost every transaction.
Unlike a person shopping for a car, a suit or a haircut, the medical patient
does not know what it is they [sic] need, what it should cost, or even, once
paid for, how much good the treatment really did. Instead of a clear speci-
fication of what is to be expected from both parties, the patient must trust
41the doctor to do what is right and to bill fairly for the necessary care ....
Patients have even less choice about hospital services. Doctors usually
choose hospitals for patients and dictate most hospital expenditures 2 Yet
doctors' decisions are shaped by factors patients would not consult. Because
doctors are typically not hospital employees, hospitals must attract doctors• 43
to attract patients. Because physicians prefer hospitals with the best
equipment, staff, and professional amenities, competition among hospitals
drives patients' costs up, not down.44
In short, doctors are not monopolists in the starkest, strictest sense. But
the market's structure, the patient's situation, and the patient's ties to the
physician effectively make patients hardly more than buyers without choice.
3. Shopping for Doctors
Patients, then, depend too much on their doctors to be free and active
consumers of medical treatments. Yet patients are hardly better consumers
when they pick the doctors on whom so much turns. Consider prices. Physi-
cians advertise little and advertise fees less. They post no prices.4 ' All this
46used to be blamed on collusion among doctors, since the AMA's Code of
39. See Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457 (2005).
40. THOMAS E. GETZEN, HEALTH ECONOMICS 102 (1997).
41. Id. at 114.
42. Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health
Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 434 (1988); Lisa M. Schwartz et al., How Do
Elderly Patients Decide Where to Go for Major Surgery?, 331 BRIT. MED. J. 821 (2005).
43. See, e.g., David Dranove & Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Industrial Organization of Health
Care Markets, in IB HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, supra note 35, at 1114 ("[H]ospitals com-
pete for admissions by providing services that complement physician work effort ... .
44. FELDSTEIN, supra note 35, at 327.
45. See generally Berkeley Rice, How to Market Your Practice, MED. ECON., Mar. 4, 2005, at
53 (describing typical approaches to marketing by physicians); Gail G. Weiss, Lead Patients to Your
Door, MED. ECON., July 26, 2002, at 55 (describing the same).
46. This was largely because of Reuben A. Kessel's somewhat polemical analysis in his
seminal article, Price Discrimination in Medicine, I J.L. & ECON. 20 (1958). Beginning in the
1970s, however, health economists began to argue that physicians' market power long predated the
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Ethics forbade advertising. However, when this ban was declared an anti-
trust violation in 1980,"7 little changed.4 s Nor do doctors discuss charges
with patients. Only ten percent of Pittsburgh patients remembered being told
what care would CoSt,4 9 and in our casual survey of North Carolina physi-
cians, only a plastic surgeon said he mentioned fees in advance.
Doctors dislike discussing fees.5 Hippocrates warned:
Should you begin by discussing fees, you will suggest to the patient either
that you will go away and leave him if no agreement be reached, or that
you will neglect him and not prescribe any immediate treatment.... I con-
sider such a worry to be harmful to a troubled patient, particularly if the
disease be acute.52
Even today, Professor Stein detects a "taboo in official American health
culture: namely, a prohibition upon allowing the physician to appear con-
cerned with financial matters. 53 Introducing money violates "the sacred by
the profane.54 Those "'selling' their services are loathe to affix a price tag
to those services at the time of the transaction or as an official precondition
to 'delivering' them. Somehow it would be immoral to do so."55 Professor
AMA's efforts to control the medical profession and that any such control could not explain doctor's
pricing behavior, such as free care or below-cost pricing for low-income patients. See, e.g., Robert T.
Masson & S. Wu, Price Discrimination for Physicians' Services, 9 J. HUM. RESOURCES 63, 74
(1974); Newhouse, supra note 36, at 176; Roy J. Ruffin & Duane E. Leigh, Charity, Competition,
and the Pricing of Doctors' Services, 8 J. HUM. RESOURCES 212 (1973). Kessel's account is now
generally regarded as seriously incomplete, if not mostly wrong. See, e.g., McGuire, supra note 35,
at 464-65 (recounting this intellectual history and rejecting Kessel's thesis).
47. Am. Med. Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd by an equally divided court,
455 U.S. 676 (1982).
48. John A. Rizzo & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Advertising and the Price, Quantity, and Quality
of Primary Care Physician Services, 27 J. HUM. RESOURCES 381, 388-89 n. 12 (1992) (documenting
that "physician price advertising continues to be quite rare" because the FFC seldom receives com-
plaints based on price advertising by physicians, and polls show that "physicians are strongly
opposed to price advertising").
49. Thomas P. O'Toole et al., Full Disclosure of Financial Costs and Options to Patients:
The Roles of Race, Age, Health Insurance, and Usual Source for Care, 15 J. HEALTH CARE POOR
UNDERSERVED 52, 56 (2004).
50. See supra note 10. This is consistent with the American College of Physicians' Ethics
Manual, which provides that "[flinancial arrangements and expectations should be clearly estab-
lished," Lois Snyder & Cathy Leffler, Ethics Manual: Fifth Edition, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
560, 571 (2005), but which omits the words "in advance" that had appeared in earlier versions, e.g.,
Ad Hoc Comm. on Med. Ethics, Am. Coll. of Physicians, American College of Physicians Ethics
Manual, 101 ANNALS INTERNAL ME. 129, 132 (1984) ("At the beginning of treatment it is good
practice for patients to have a general knowledge of physicians' fees and the probable overall costs
of medical care.").
51. See generally Fridolf Kudlien, Medicine as a "Liberal Art" and the Question of the
Physician's Income, 31 J. HIST. MED. 448 (1976) (reviewing the history of physicians' practices and
ethics regarding fees).
52. John Fabre, Medicine as a profession: Hip, Hip, Hippocrates: extracts from The
Hippocratic Doctor, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 1669, 1669 (1997).
53. Stein, supra note 9, at 1.
54. Id. at 3.
55. Id. at 11. This "position has been articulated so frequently to me by apprentice and vet-
eran physicians alike that it might be called official." Id. at 8.
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Stein thinks physicians "fear that to introduce monetary matters into an al-
ready unequal (i.e., parent-child) relationship would only widen the
inequality, and would, moreover, demystify the parental, sacred, qualities
that are necessary for an effective clinical relationship."56 And perhaps phy-
sicians-who are generally far wealthier than their patients-are
embarrassed to discuss fees patients may find inexplicably high and crush-
ingly burdensome.
Because physicians do not volunteer prices, patients must ask. But do
you want to begin treatment by haggling over prices? You're sick, anxious,
and intimidated. So you let the doctor set the boundaries and tone of your
relationship. In one study, only twelve percent of the people questioned had
ever negotiated with a provider to get a lower price.57 And in our pilot inter-
views in 2006 with a convenience sample of thirteen people, only a few
patients (who knew their doctors well) were comfortable asking about
costs.
5 8
Consider the well-educated, self-reliant woman trained in economics
who injured her foot and asked a physician to refer her to a radiology clinic.
The X-ray having shown a fracture, she hobbled to a nearby podiatrist. Told
the podiatrist didn't "take walk-ins" (which she thought ironic), she pleaded
successfully to be seen. Since she had high-deductible insurance, the podia-
trist prescribed a boot rather than a cast. Did this conscientious consumer
ever ask about money?
A: No, because I figured I'm here, I'm not going to insult him by saying
"how much do you charge?".. . I could have gone to the other [medical
office in the same building], but let's say the other one upstairs is
higher, am I going to come back downstairs now that I've insulted him?
So it's a little difficult to ask him his price ....
Q: In general, you said it's insulting to ask the doctor. Is that generally
true?
A: For me it is.... [I do ask my dentist about costs,] but with doctors
somehow, there's a little more respect there ... in the sense that you
don't want to get off on the wrong foot with the doctor, even the foot
doctor [chuckle].
Q: Yeah, after all, you don't want your doctor thinking badly about you.
56. Id. at 9; see also Atul Gawande, Piecework: Medicine's Money Problem, NEW YORKER,
Apr. 4, 2005, at 44 ("Doctors aren't supposed to be in it for the money, and the more concerned a
doctor seems to be about making money the more suspicious people become about the care being
provided.").
57. Sara R. Collins et al., Gaps in Health Insurance: An All-American Problem,
COMMONWEALTH FUND, Apr. 2006, at 20, available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usrdoc/
Collins-gapshltins_920.pdf.
58. The person described in the next paragraph, for instance, said she would be much more
willing to ask her regular doctor about the costs of treatment than to ask the hospital because she
"would be comfortable with the trust relationship I've got with [my physician]."
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A: Yeah, getting revenge somehow, perhaps.59
If the circumstances and psychology of medical care deterred this
strongly motivated, well-educated, cost-conscious, and self-confident patient
from asking about prices, who would be braver?
If doctors can't discuss costs, could they communicate prices in some
other way? Several generations ago, physicians did post fees. One influen-
tial guide advised nineteenth-century physicians to hang up a fee table "in a
semi-prominent position in your office, that you may refer patients to it
whenever occasion requires.... You can, when necessary, point to it and ask
for your fee, and let them know you keep no books for [transient] office pa-
tients." 6 This is how retail-store clinics work today.6' But when fee
schedules were common, doctors, like these clinics, offered only a few
dozen services. Now, doctors provide thousands of services, procedures,
supplies, devices, and drugs.
Hard as it is to find out what doctors' bills may mean, it is horribly
harder to anticipate hospitals' charges. Once, hospitals resembled special-
ized hotels or modem nursing homes: They sold a day in a bed attended by a
nurse, and prices could be specified for the room and the nursing.3 But the
number and costs of hospital services have multiplied and, funded by public
and private insurance, hospitals have become temples of medical technol-
ogy. Their "charge masters" list from 12,000 to 45,000 items.64 Who could
59. The interview responses in this Article are taken from semistructured pilot interviews
conducted in the summer of 2006.
60. D.W. CATHELL, THE PHYSICIAN HIMSELF 16 (Baltimore, Cushings & Bailey 1882). He
added, "Of course you may omit its cash enforcement towards persons with whom you have a regu-
lar account." Id.
61. See supra note 6.
62. See GEORGE ROSEN, FEES AND FEE BILLS: SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF MEDICAL
PRACTICE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (Henry E. Sigerist ed., 1946).
63. See, e.g., Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 679 (N.M. 1985) (finding that a
contract for an extended-care retirement center was not unconscionable, in part because the pur-
chaser "engaged in extensive comparative shopping"); see generally FELDSTEIN, supra note 35, at
566-67 (describing the market for nursing-home care); John A. Nyman, The Private Demand for
Nursing Home Care, 8 J. HEALTH ECON. 209 (1989).
64. Hospital charge masters are described in What's the Cost?: Proposals to Provide Con-
sumers with Better Information about Healthcare Service Costs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 103 (2006) (testimony of
Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Finance and Management)
[hereinafter Anderson Testimony 2006]; ALLEN DOBSON ET AL., A STUDY OF HOSPITAL CHARGE
SETTING PRACTICES (2005), available at http://www.medpac.gov/publications/contractorreports/
Dec05_.Charge-setting.pdf; Gerard F. Anderson, From "Soak the Rich" to "Soak the Poor": Recent
Trends In Hospital Pricing, 26 HEALTH AFF. 780, 786 (2007) [hereinafter Anderson, Soak the Rich];
Nation, supra note 8, at 116-18; Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing Of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos
Behind a Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 58-59 (2006). Examples of charge masters are avail-
able at California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development, Find Data-Hospital
Chargemasters A, http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HQAD/Hospital/Chargemaster/2005/chrgmstrA.htm
(last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
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master such a torrent of charges? 6' Furthermore, because of the way insurers
pay hospitals and because of the complexity and unpredictability of medical
care, 66 hospitals usually charge A la carte rather than bundling services into
units that would permit price comparisons. Perhaps insurers and regulators
can navigate the Hampton Court Maze of hospital charges, but patients as-
suredly cannot.
Yet another perplexity lurks in wait for the patient who tries to price
doctors' services. Each physician deals with many insurers, each with fees
negotiated in a tumultuous market that regards prices as trade secrets. One
Harvard surgeon's group has a six-hundred page "master fee schedule" with
"twenty-four columns across the top, one for each of the major insurance
plans, and, running down the side, a row for every service a doctor can bill
for."
67 Even a superb office staff might not know who would pay what until
the insurer completed claims "adjudication." Thus, in one study, less than a
third of the patients could ascertain prices in one call or visit. 68 Over six-
hundred fictitious uninsured patients asked sixty-four California hospitals
about the cost of one of twenty-five different services, such as ultrasounds
or cardiac catheterizations. While three-quarters of the "inquiries were
65. See Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange Park, 661 So. 2d 1239, 1242 n.3 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct.
1995) ("The charge master is reported at oral argument to be a document of hundreds of pages, in
code."). The Payne case continues:
Payne and similarly situated patients are buying not one commodity, watermelons, but rather a
long list of pills, supplies, and services, for which patients would have to review an allegedly
unavailable, lengthy, coded document to know the contract price.
The instant case... presents nothing so simple as an "hourly rate" dispute; rather, an allegedly
complicated and unobtainable master charge list containing hundreds of items is at issue.
Id. at 1242. The case of Doe v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, 46 S.W.3d 191 (Tenn. 2001),
included a similar sentiment:
[The] "Charge Master" [is] a confidential list of charges made by the hospital for all its goods
and services, which is used to compute charges for all private commercial patients who are
treated on a fee-for-service basis. The Charge Master is compiled and maintained by the hospi-
tal's chief financial officer on the hospital's computer system. In 1991, the Charge Master
contained approximately 295 pages and listed prices for approximately 7,650 items. The
Charge Master is considered confidential proprietary information and is not shown to anyone
other than the officers and employees of the hospital and authorized consultants. The Charge
Master is adjusted on a weekly basis to reflect current cost data; the hospital's costs are
marked up by a mathematical formula designed to produce a targeted amount of profit for the
hospital.
Id. at 194.
66. Porter and Teisberg argue that medical pricing could be further bundled by using entire
episodes of care for particular ailments. MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH OLMSTED TEISBERG,
REDEFINING HEALTH CARE: CREATING VALUE-BASED COMPETITION ON RESULTS 105-111 (2006).
Perhaps, but there is an irreducible core of uncertainty, complexity, and variability in medical diag-
nosis and treatment that has always hampered bundling unless it is imposed (such as by Medicare
Diagnosis Related Groups ("DRGs")).
67. Gawande, supra note 56, at 44.
68. Press Release, Cal. HealthCare Found., Where's the Price Tag? Mystery Shoppers Un-
cover the Frustration of Shopping for Hospital Care (Dec. 14, 2005), http://www.chcf.org/press/
view.cfm?itemID1 17607 (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
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ultimately answered with a firm or estimated price, more than a third [of the
inquirers] had to make three or more calls to obtain the answer."
69
In sum, patients dislike asking about prices and have trouble even when
sturdy enough to try. Even if patients could be given estimates, only patients
who knew what they needed could benefit. But who knows that before visit-
ing the doctor? Even doctors often can't predict treatments. 70 Even patients
ask about price along the way, all the problems we've described remain. In
addition, backing out of treatment may be dicey. As Alain Enthoven la-
mented, "When my injured child is lying bleeding on the operating table is
hardly the time when I want to negotiate with the doctor over fees or the
number of sutures that will be used."'', For example, one educated and re-
sourceful person we interviewed described her concerns about paying for
uncovered treatment for migraines. The hospital "couldn't give us a handle
... on what we might be facing." Her husband "got fairly adamant about
wanting to know" and pleaded for "some kind of knowledge. 'You don't
know how many treatments this is going to take, but what kind of ballpark
things are we expecting?'" He was never told. Still, his wife "had no choice
[because] I was in such pain."
Q: So you are in the hospital in a state of vulnerability, confusion and un-
certainty and you must be wondering, as the therapist says "let's try this
and let's do that," you must be wondering what that is going to cost,
right?
A: ... I was in such excruciating pain that if they had said "let's amputate
a leg" I would have asked no questions. I asked no questions about any
procedure they were recommending....
Q: Did you ever think they were running up the bill on you?
A: .... [My husband] felt like "they are just running that up because no-
body is going to say anything."
Q: .... [I]t is hard to fuss in the middle of things.
A: He made enough [fuss] that the girl from resource management came
... to talk to us and calm him down .... "Everything is going to be all
69. Id.
70. See A Review of Hospital Billing and Collection Practices, Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 18
(2004) (testimony of Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Finance and
Management) [hereinafter Anderson Testimony 2004]; Paul B. Ginsburg, Shopping For Price In
Medical Care: Insurers are Best Positioned to Provide Consumers with the Information They Need,
But Will They Deliver?, 26 HEALTH AFF. W208, W210 (2007), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
reprint/26/2/w208 (web exclusive). Important exceptions include specialists who provide discrete or
limited services, such as a diagnostic service done at a separate facility (for example, MRIs) or
fairly simple surgery for a condition handled in a standardized way, for instance, vasectomy or un-
complicated childbirth.
71. ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN 34-35 (1980).
72. She is an administrator with a doctorate who is a model consumer and who manages her
family's finances and investments.
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right." Never any facts or figures to back that, but almost patronizing.
At that point, [we thought] "Okay, whatever."
7'
Consumers must decide whether a purchase is worth its price. And that
is the heart of consumer-directed health care. But medicine's uncertainty,
patients' vulnerabilities, doctors' mores, and the market's structure combine
to conceal prices from purchasers. Often, the patient can only agree (implic-
itly or explicitly) to pay whatever charges the provider imposes. As one
court said:
The price term "all charges" is ... the only practical way in which the ob-
ligations of the patient to pay can be set forth, given the fact that nobody
yet knows just what condition the patient has, and what treatments will be
necessary to remedy what ails him or her. Besides handing the patient an
inches-high stack of papers detailing the hospital's charges for each and
every conceivable service, which he or she could not possibly read and un-
derstand before agreeing to treatment, the form contract employed by [the
hospital] is the only way to communicate to a patient the nature of his or
her financial obligations to the hospital.74
True, prices can sometimes be specified, and sometimes patients can ex-
tract them. 75 These situations are touted as models for consumer-directed
76health care, but they are exceptions, exceptions that (because the services
are relatively simple) prove the rule. And true, when patients foot the bill,
they do change their behavior. For example, they delay seeking care or cut
back on drugs." But this does not show that patients are successful consum-
ers, since these patients often economize unwisely.
78
We have seen that across the board patients are ill equipped and badly
positioned to purchase medical care well. So extreme are these disabilities
that patients must often be wonderfully fortunate even to ascertain the most
basic kind of market information-price. Patients, then, will rarely know
enough to be successful consumers and will normally follow their doctors'
counsel in making medical purchases.
73. See supra note 58.
74. DiCarlo v. St. Mary's Hosp., No. 05-1665, 2006 WL 2038498, at *4 (D.N.J. July 19,
2006); see also Nation, supra note 8, at 116-18 (describing hospital price contracts).
75. For example, patients typically consult with physicians about the cost of cosmetic sur-
gery. Prices of laser procedures to correct eyesight (like radial keratotomy) are commonly
advertised. Ha T. Tu & Jessica H. May, Self-Pay Markets In Health Care: Consumer Nirvana Or
Caveat Emptor?, 26 HEALTH AFF. W217, W217-18 (2007), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
reprint/26/2/w2l7 (web exclusive). And walk-up clinics staffed by nurse practitioners or physicians'
assistants post a short list of standard prices. See supra note 6.
76. E.g., MICHAEL F CANNON & MICHAEL D. TANNER, HEALTHY COMPETITION 6-7 (2005).
77. MICHAEL A. MORRISEY, PRICE SENSITIVITY IN HEALTH CARE (2d ed. 2005), available at
http://www.nfib.com/objec/IO_-24643.html; Thomas Rice & Karen Y. Matsuoka, The Impact of
Cost-Sharing on Appropriate Utilization and Health Status: A Review of the Literature on Seniors,
61 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 415 (2004).
78. See Rice & Matsuoka, supra note 77.
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D. Doctors'Prices and Doctors'Power
We have argued that the structure of medical care gives providers sub-
stantial market power over prices for uninsured care. However, if providers
don't exploit that power to set high prices, their market situation may not
matter. We now argue that doctors have been willing to use that power, that
they have used it to keep prices high for some patients, but that professional
and social considerations shape how doctors use their power.
Before widespread health insurance, doctors displayed their impressive
market power in a notable way-they adjusted charges to fit patients' in-
come, so some patients paid as much as three to five times more than others.
In 1931, one doctor's median fee for treating acute diabetes was $402, but
his fees ranged almost fivefold, from $232 to $1052; X-ray treatments for
severe acne could cost from $70 to $210.79 For a major operation, surgeons
often charged patients one month's salary.8°
These imposing variations in price demonstrate doctors' market power
and the complexity of their motives in setting fees. Were maximizing in-
come their only goal, doctors would accept only patients who could pay the
marginal costs of their services. Instead, nineteenth-century physicians ap-
81parently charged the rich more so they could charge the poor less. We say
"apparently" because sliding fees might help doctors charge everybody
82maximally rather than subsidize care for the poor. And indeed, by the
1930s, sliding fees were denounced as "a device for raising fees above the
standard [rates] ... rather than for lowering them for the poor, their major
historical justification."83
By the middle of the twentieth century, doctors' market power had ex-
panded yet further, and doctors used that power in less benevolent ways.
79. MICHAEL M. DAVIS, PAYING YOUR SICKNESS BILLS 142-43(1931).
80. Houda v. McDonald, 294 P. 249, 251 (Wash. 1930); see also Max Seham, Who Pays for
the Doctor?, NEW REPUBLIC, July 9, 1956, at 11.
81. See David Rosner, Health Care for the "Truly Needy": Nineteenth-Century Origins of
the Concept, 60 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. HEALTH & Soc'Y 355 (1982); Ruffin & Leigh,
supra note 46. A price-competitive market would prevent this cross-subsidy because wealthier pa-
tients would seek out cheaper doctors. Indeed, some wealthy patients did just that at the turn of the
century. Dressing in tattered clothes, they would present themselves as indigent patients. Frederick
Holme Wiggin, The Abuse of Medical Charity, MED. NEWS, Oct. 23, 1897, at 521. This was widely
viewed as a blatant "abuse of charity" because it threatened the "Robin Hood" social compact that
allowed doctors to charge the wealthy somewhat more in order to help provide care to the poor. Gert
H. Brieger, The Use And Abuse of Medical Charities In Late Nineteenth Century America, 67 AM. J.
PUB, HEALTH 264 (1977).
82. E.g., Kessel, supra note 46.
83. HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE 54 (1961). Walton Hamilton, a former Yale law professor, explained:
"[Ciharity work" and "the sliding scale" came into existence together; they are complementary
aspects of the single institution of the collective provision of the physician's income; ... [but]
in our modem world the sliding-scale is an instrument easily capable of abuse. Above all, it is
significant that the connection between the two has been broken, and that the older justifica-
tions are no longer relevant.
COMM. ON COSTS OF MED. CARE, MEDICAL CARE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 191 (1932).
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Changes in medical education and licensure reduced the supply of doctors,
and medical progress expanded the range of treatments . Doctors took ad-
vantage of the leverage these developments gave them by charging "what
the traffic will bear,""5 meaning whatever desperate patients would pay for
life or limb." The care of poorer patients was increasingly relegated to free
clinics and, later, nonprofit hospitals.87
All this discredited the sliding scale, but health insurance killed it. s" In-
surers wanted consistency and objectivity-"usual, customary, and
reasonable" ("UCR") fees.89 Even this did not curtail doctors' market power.
"Reasonable" meant "usual and customary," which invited doctors to raise
their fees, and many did, alarmingly.9° The next assault on doctors' market
power came when managed care replaced UCR payments with negotiated or
imposed fee schedules. This did deprive doctors of most of their leverage
against government-regulated or managed-care insurance, 9' although else-
where doctors retain much of their market power.
We know that doctors retain market power because they have responded
to the concessions given up in bargaining in two ways: by "cost shifting"
(raising prices for uninsured patients) and by "demand inducement"
84. ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH: AMERICAN HOSPITALS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1989).
85. HUGH CABOT, THE DOCTOR'S BILL 123 (1935).
86. Cf Leonard M. Fleck, The Costs of Caring: Who Pays? Who Profits? Who Panders?,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 2006, at 13 (criticizing the practice of modem drug companies
to price some cancer drugs at $100,000 a year based on "the inherent value of these life-sustaining
technologies") (citing Alex Berenson, A Cancer Drug Shows Promise, at a Price That Many Can't
Pay, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at Al); Kessel, supra note 46 (criticizing physicians' pricing behav-
ior).
87. Charles E. Rosenberg, Social Class and Medical Care in Nineteenth-Century America:
The Rise and Fall of the Dispensary, 29 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED Sci. 32 (1974).
88. See SOMERS & SOMERS, supra note 83, at 53 (noting that, in 1955, physicians' use of a
sliding scale "appear[ed] to be in decline ... consistent with ... the growth of health insurance");
Masson & Wu, supra note 46, at 76; Jonathan Spivak, Doctors' Fees: "Ability to Pay" Begins Giv-
ing Way to More Nearly Uniform Charges, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1959, at 1. More recently, the
national Community Tracking Survey reports an "alarming" increase (from 23.7% in a 1996-97
survey to 31.8% in a 2004-05 survey) in the proportion of physicians who provide no reduced-price
or free care to patients on account of financial need. Peter J. Cunningham & Jessica H. May, A
Growing Hole in the Safety Net: Physician Charity Care Declines Again, CENTER FOR STUDYING
HEALTH SYS. CHANGE TRACKING REP., Mar. 2006, available at http://www.hschange.com/
CONTENT/826/826.pdf; Marc A. Rodwin, Medical Commerce, Physician Entrepreneurialism, and
Conflicts Of Interest, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 387, 393 (2007).
89. Cromwell & Burstein, supra note 15, at 54; Benson B. Roe, The UCR Boondoggle: A
Death KnellforPrivate Practice?, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 41(1981).
90. Martin S. Feldstein, The Rising Price of Physician's Services, 52 REV. ECON. STAT. 121
(1970); Anne A. Scitovsky, Changes in the Costs of Treatment of Selected Illnesses, 1951-64, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 1182 (1967).
91. See McGuire, supra note 35, at 527 ("[T]he prices chosen by health plans are probably
best regarded as being determined by demand and supply."); Mark V. Pauly & Mark A. Satterthwaite,
The Pricing of Primary Care Physicians'Services: A Test of the Role of Consumer Information, 12
BELL J. ECON. 488, 489 (198 1) (describing physicians in metropolitan areas as "price setters").
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(convincing patients to use more services).92 But while doctors have clearly
used these devices,93 they have not necessarily maximized their profits-
doctors "often do not set their prices as high as the market will bear."94 One
theory is that doctors are restrained by a sense of professional duty. Another
explanation is the "target income" hypothesis, which supposes that physi-
cians develop goals for their income and use market power to achieve
them. 95 Thus economists generally see doctors as profit-satisficers rather
96than profit-maximizers.
While physicians have not consistently exploited their market power, the
enormous disparities between what insured and uninsured patients pay sug-
gest that doctors sometimes charge exploitative fees, fees that may call for
judicial intervention. In particular, the differences between what doctors
charge insured and uninsured patients are eye-popping. For example, one
study calculated that physicians overall charge 79% more than they receive
from insurers.97 Differentials vary.98 For basic office or hospital visits, pri-
mary-care physicians typically charge one-third to one-half more than they
receive from insurers (i.e., insurers get discounts of 25%-33%).99 Markups
are substantially higher for high-tech tests and specialists' invasive proce-
dures. Across a range of specialty services (echocardiography, coronary
catheterization, liver biopsy, upper GI endoscopy, circumcision, flexible
sigmoidoscopies, hysterectomy, appendectomy, gall bladder removal, and
arthroscopic knee surgery), physicians charge roughly two to two-and-a-half
92. For reviews of this literature, see FELDSTEIN, supra note 35, at 286-87; Martin Gaynor,
Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services, 3 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 211 (1994); and McGuire, supra note 35, at 503-19.
93. Cf Uwe E. Reinhardt, Commentary, 53 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 274, 285 (1996) ("[I1t
has always been widely taken for granted that physicians can recoup from private payers a substan-
tial proportion of any income losses they suffer as a result of cost-containment efforts....").
94. Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 477. Another prominent health economist reached the same
conclusion more than thirty years earlier. Newhouse, supra note 36, at 182 (finding "some evidence
that physicians do not maximize short-run profits" despite their "inherently monopolistic" power).
95. See generally, McGuire, supra note 35, at 522-26 (describing, but rejecting, the target-
income theory).
96. Masson & Wu, supra note 46, at 63-64.
97. Ginsburg, supra note 70.
98. A comprehensive study in the 1980s found that physicians' fees had more than double
the markup, relative to resource costs, for invasive procedures than for ordinary office visits, with
imaging and laboratory procedures falling in between. W.C. Hsiao et al., Results and Policy Implica-
tions of the Resource-Based Relative-Value Study, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 881, 885-88 (1988).
99. Wayne J. Gugliolmo, Bridging the Reimbursement Gap, MED. ECON., Nov. 8, 2002, at
96, 98; Dorothy L. Pennachio, Fees & reimbursements, MED. ECON., Oct. 10, 2003, at 96, 97;
Dorothy L. Pennachio, How do your fees mesh?, MED. ECON., Nov. 5, 2004, at 26, 28.
The degree of markup (or discount) tends to vary by type of insurance, with private insurance
paying roughly 10-25% more than Medicare. ZACHARY DYCKMAN & PEGGY HESS, SURVEY OF




times what insurers pay.'00 In contrast, before aggressive managed care dis-
counts, physicians' markups over Medicare and private insurance were
roughly 25%-50% for both primary care and specialty procedures.' ° '
These striking figures reveal the impressive market power that doctors
can and do wield. However, doctors' fees are rational and moderate com-
pared with hospitals' magnificently baroque and extravagant charges. To
them we now turn.
E. Hospital Prices
We have already said that hospital prices for uninsured patients are in-
comprehensible. We now will show that those prices are little disciplined by
the market and often unfair. Before managed care, hospitals billed insured
and uninsured patients similarly. In 1960, "It]here were no discounts; every-
one paid the same rates"-usually cost plus ten percent.' °z But as some
insurers demanded deep discounting, hospitals vigorously shifted costs to
patients with less clout. ' 03 Since uninsured patients are protected in this
Darwinian marketplace by neither insurers nor regulators, hospitals are
loosed to charge what they will.
The egregious failure of the hospital market is revealed by the astonish-
ing differences between what hospitals nominally charge and what insured
patients pay.'04 Insurers pay about forty cents per dollar of listed charges.' 5
Thus hospitals bill uninsured patients 250% more than insured patients. This
disparity has exploded over the past decade: since the early 1990s, list prices
have increased almost three times more than costs, and markups over costs
have more than doubled, from 74% to 164%. '06
100. See Pennachio, supra note 99. These averages conceal wide variations. A recent physi-
cian's narrative on medical fees, for instance, described one surgeon who charged more than ten
times Medicare rates for some procedures. Gawande, supra note 56, at 48.
101. See Cromwell & Burstein, supra note 15, at 53, 58.
102. Anderson Testimony 2004, supra note 70, at 18.
103. See Jason S. Lee et al., Medicare Payment Policy: Does Cost Shifting Matter?, 2003
HEALTH AFF. W3-480, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.480vi.pdf (web exclu-
sive) (reporting broad consensus that hospitals are able to shift costs to private insurers); Michael A.
Morrisey, Cost Shifting: New Myths, Old Confusion, and Enduring Reality, 2003 HEALTH AFE. W3-
489, W3-490, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.489vi.pdf (web exclusive) (ex-
plaining that cost-shifting behavior indicates both ability to exercise market power and previous
restraint in doing so); supra note 14.
104. The absence of meaningful price competition can also be seen in the extreme differences
in the list prices for the same service among hospitals in the same market. Among California hospi-
tals, for instance, a Wall Street Journal reporter found that a basic chest x-ray with two views ranged
from $120 to $1,519; a comprehensive metabolic panel ranged from $97 to $1,733; a CT scan of the
head (without contrast) went from $882 to $6,599; a single tablet of Tylenol could be no charge or
$7. Lucette Lagnado, Medical Markup: California Hospitals Open Books, Showing Huge Price
Differences, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2004, at Al.
105. Anderson, Soak the Rich, supra note 64, at 780; Reinhardt, supra note 64, at 57.
106. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION, A DATA BOOK: HEALTHCARE SPENDING
AND THE MEDICARE PROGRAM, JUNE 2004, at 103, available at http://www.medpac.gov/
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At some hospitals the disparities are smaller, but at others they are larger
still. 0 7 Undiscounted charges are often three or four times the rates given
insurers, and there are "contracts where the discount from list price was over
[ninety] percent."' ' Charges alleged or found in recent lawsuits include
$20,000 for two nights' hospitalization for pregnancy comphcations,
$12,863 for a day's treatment for shortness of breath,"0 "$52 for a single
tablet of Tylenol with codeine,""' and a half million dollars for twenty-three
days of treatment-twice what Medicare insurance allowed." 2 The Wall
Street Journal described a patient treated two days for a suspected heart at-
tack, for whom the "bill for the hospital stay totaled $29,500. That bill did
not include an additional $6800 from the cardiologist, $1000 for the ambu-
lance ride, and $7500" for a stent.' Had the patient qualified for "state-
sponsored healthcare through Medicaid, the hospital would have accepted a
payment of only $6000 for the twenty-one hour hospital stay, $1000 for the
cardiologist, and $165 for the ambulance ride. The list price for the stent
was $3195, less than fifty percent of what [the patient] was charged."
' 4
Rational markets do not produce such bizarre prices.' Surveying "the
chaos that now reigns behind the opaque curtain of proprietary prices in the
U.S. hospital system," Uwe Reinhardt laments hospital price-setting that
publications/congressional-reports/JunO4DataBookEntire reportlinks.pdf; MEDICARE PAYMENT
ADVISORY COMMISSION, A DATA BOOK: HEALTHCARE SPENDING AND THE MEDICARE PROGRAM,
JUNE 2006, at 101, available at http://www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional-reports/
Jun06DataBookEntire-report.pdf.
107. In Ohio, for instance, hospital markups over costs in 2003 ranged by metro region aver-
ages from 83% to 217%, SEIU DISTRICT 1199 CARE FOR OHIO, TWICE THE PRICE 5 (2005),
http://s57.advocateoffice.com (follow "Twice the Price" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 6, 2007), and
across all hospitals from 37% to 279%, id. at 18-20.
108. Anderson Testimony 2006, supra note 64, at 106. For instance, in 2002, the average
charge among Philadelphia-area hospitals for medical management of a heart attack was over
$30,000, whereas "[m]ost insurers paid less than $10,000." Anderson Testimony 2004, supra note
70, at 20. A website that tracks hospital prices reported that a Philadelphia hospital charged $15,000
for a cornea transplant that private insurers reimburse $4,700 for. Michael Mason, Bargaining Down
that CT Scan is Suddenly Possible, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2007, at F5.
109. Kolari v. N.Y-Presbyterian Hosp., 382 E Supp. 2d 562, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
110. Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1267-68 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
111. Hall v. Humana Hosp. Daytona Beach, 686 So. 2d 653, 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
112. Valley Hosp. v. Kroll, 847 A.2d 636, 639 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003); cf Burdette
Tomlin Mem'l Hosp. v. Estate of Malone, 845 A.2d 615, 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (de-
scribing how hospital charged patient over three times what Medicare would have allowed).
113. Leah Snyder Batchis, Comment, Can Lawsuits Help the Uninsured Access Affordable
Hospital Care? Potential Theories for Uninsured Patient Plaintiffs, 78 TEnMP. L. REV. 493, 493
(2005) (footnotes omitted) (summarizing the story reported by Lucette Lagnado, Anatomy of a
Hospital Bill: Uninsured Patients Often Face Big Markups on Small Items, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21,
2004, at B1).
114. Batchis, supra note 113, at 493.
115. Hospital pricing is partly driven by the way Medicare pays hospitals-typically a fixed
amount per visit. For patients who stay much longer than normal, Medicare pays an extra amount
based on how the hospital sets its standard charges, but only if the hospital actually bills and collects
its full "list prices" from non-Medicare patients. Anderson, Soak the Rich, supra note 64, at 785;
Nation, supra note 8, at 121-23.
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"appears to be ad hoc, without any external constraints."'16 Hospital execu-
tives confess that "the vast majority of [charges] have no relation to
anything, and certainly not to cost,""' 7 and see "no method to this mad-
ness.""' 8 If there is a method, it is perverse and destructive, because
competition spurs higher prices." 9 In short, "effectively, there [is] market
failure" in pricing uninsured hospital services. "°
Weird pricing might not matter if hospitals charged the rich more so they
could charge the poor less." ' Hardly. All uninsured patients-rich and poor
alike-face staggering markups. When patients don't pay, hospitals rush
their accounts to collection agencies that belligerently exploit their legal
weapons, including home foreclosures and personal bankruptcies. 
22
Perhaps this is changing. Faced with congressional hearings and class-
action litigation, some hospitals advertise "patient-friendly" pricing they
claim is clearer, saner, and fairer.2 3 Some hospitals give uninsured patients
discounts124 in reaction to criticism of charging the most vulnerable patients
116. Reinhardt, supra note 64, at 59, 66.
117. DoBSON ET AL., supra note 64, at 7.
118. Reinhardt, supra note 64, at 57.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44. Thus, hospitals' markups of charges over
costs and over insurers' payments are much higher in urban areas with a greater concentration of
hospitals than in rural areas. Anderson, Soak the Rich, supra note 64, at 782 ex.I. For instance, the
states with the greatest markups are California, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and those with the
lowest are Idaho, Montana, Vermont and Wyoming. In high markup states, hospitals' charges aver-
age more than 4 times their costs, or 3.5 times their net receipts. In low markup states, charges
average less than 2 times their costs, or less than 1.7 times their gross receipts. Id. at 783 ex.2.
(Maryland is also among the group of low-markup states, but that is because it is the only state in
the country with strict regulation of hospital charges. See Gerard F Anderson, All-payer Rate Set-
ting: Down But Not Out, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., SUPP. 1991, at 35, 37 [hereinafter
Anderson, All-payer Rate Setting].)
120. Anderson Testimony 2004, supra note 70, at 20.
121. Arguably, higher charges to uninsured patients might be fair if richer patients paid them
in full and hospitals used the surplus from very high markups to offset losses from uninsured pa-
tients who can pay little or nothing. Hospital administrators report that they collect only about ten
percent of their charges to uninsured patients. E-mail from Terry Rappuhn, Project Leader, Patient
Friendly Billing Project, to Mark A. Hall, Professor of Law and Public Health, Wake Forest Univer-
sity (Feb. 16, 2007 11:59:00 EST) (on file with authors); see also Joel S. Weissman et al., Bad Debt
and Free Care in Massachusetts Hospitals, I I HEALTH AF. 148, 154 ex.2 (1992) (reporting that
Massachusetts hospitals in 1988 wrote off as bad debt nintey-three percent of their charges to self-
pay (uninsured) patients). This suggests that hospitals forgive much of what uninsured patients owe,
but usually only after billing these patients in full and sending bills to collection, sometimes causing
bankruptcy.
122. See supra text accompanying note 7.
123. Andrea B. Staiti et al., Balancing Margin and Mission: Hospitals Alter Billing and Col-
lection Practices for Uninsured Patients, CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE ISSUE
BRIEF, Oct. 2005, available at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/788/788.pdf.
124. Id. A few states require these discounts in order for hospitals to maintain their charitable,
tax-exempt status. See John D. Colombo, Federal and State Tax Exemption Policy, Medical Debt




the highest fees.' The American Hospital Association advises hospitals to
"offer discounts to patients who do not qualify under a charity care policy
for free ... care,' ', 26 and it reports that some hospitals "have developed a
sliding-fee scale that specifies different percentage discounts from gross
charges depending on patients' household incomes.!'  But such pricing is
hardly ubiquitous, is unproved, and perhaps appeals less to for-profit than
non-profit hospitals. In any event, as long as some hospitals have patients
sign open-ended contracts, bill them multiples of competitive prices, and
hound them for money they don't have, courts need to protect them.
F. Summary
Adequate markets permit-indeed, help-consumers shop for good ser-
vices at good prices. Even in such markets, however, consumers often
stumble when buying unfamiliar products. Furthermore, several features of
illness and its treatment prevent prudent shopping in medical markets. 
2
1
First, the debilitation of illness and the urgency of medical care make pa-
tients lax consumers and inhibit them from switching providers. Second,
patients often cannot really choose treatment or provider, since options are
often few and since patients depend on doctors in selecting hospitals and
specialists. Third, doctors dislike telling patients about costs and patients
dislike asking. Fourth, patients' treatments are often unpredictable. Fifth,
doctors' and especially hospitals' prices are so complex and arbitrary that
patients could not hope to understand them were they revealed. Sixth, pro-
viders protect themselves by presenting patients with form contracts
obliging them to pay whatever the provider eventually asks. In sum, patients
regularly begin treatment not knowing their needs, their alternatives, or their
costs. Almost helplessly, they agree to pay whatever providers charge for
whatever services they supply. This is a desperate market in which consum-
ers can only struggle as flies to wanton boys.
No one should dream that the market's failure can easily be fixed or that
the failure is due to a remediable cause, like the presence of insurance. The
failure's roots go deep into the nature of medical care. In a simpler world
half a century ago, "it was assumed that competitive market forces had a
role in determining pre-insurance prices for medical services, including
physician's fees and hospital rates as well as the price of drugs, devices, and
*ancillary services.' ' 29 Even in that simpler world, however,
125. Beverly Cohen, The Controversy Over Hospital Charges To The Uninsured-No Villains,
No Heroes, 51 VILL. L. REV. 95 (2006); Batchis, supra note 114.
126. AM. Hosp. Ass'N, HOSPITAL BILLING AND COLLECTION PRACTICES 3 (2003), http://
www.aha.org/aha/content/2004/pdf/guidelinesfinalweb.pdf.
127. HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS'N & AM. Hosp. ASS'N, HOSPITALS SHARE INSIGHTS TO
IMPROVE FINANCIAL POLICIES FOR UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED PATIENTS (2005),
http://www.hfma.org/NR/rdonlyres/1D57ACAO-OAA I-43DA-8E7B-
8A604DDEE664/0/2005_pfb-report.pdf.
128. See Ginsburg, supra note 70.
129. Roe, supra note 89, at 43.
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few patients either knew or tried to discover whether their health care
could be purchased at different prices; prices were never published or ad-
vertised. Patients generally had faith in their physicians and assumed the
fees were fair and valid-whether or not they could afford to pay them.
They obediently entered whatever hospital they were sent to and took their
prescriptions to the pharmacy or provider that the physician suggested.
Experience indicates that few patients, even those who complained about
the costs, did any shopping around for better prices. 30
These enduring features of therapeutic relationships give rise to mo-
nopolistic market power that is ripe for exploitation. To be sure, exploitation
is not pervasive. Doctors, on average, apparently are more restrained than
hospitals,' perhaps because they have longer relationships with patients,
have a stronger sense of professional obligation, or feel fewer of the pres-
sures that distort hospital pricing." Nevertheless, many physicians and most
hospitals exploit their market power to induce patients to agree to pay what
they are asked and then charge the uninsured fabulously more than the in-
sured.
II. JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE PATIENT
How ought courts respond to the plight of the hapless patient charged
predatory prices in a dysfunctional market? Should courts treat medical con-
tracts like ordinary commercial contracts and leave patients to their bargain?
If not, what can courts do for patients?
A. Should Courts Protect Patients?
As we have shown, the very disabilities that make people patients make
them poor consumers. The relationships among patients, doctors, and hospi-
tals make ordinary commercial relations uneasy and undesirable. And
providers can compel patients to sign blank checks which providers can
complete in dismaying ways. The law already recognizes consumers' sus-
ceptibility, patients' vulnerability, and doctors' power in numerous ways;
protecting patients when they must be consumers logically extends that rec-
ognition.
The law responds to patients' exceptional vulnerability by altering sev-
eral assumptions about commercial relationships. For example, the law
spurns caveat emptor and the presumption that parties contract at arm's
length and instead makes the doctor a fiduciary:
[T]here is more between a patient and his physician than a mere contract
under which the physician promises to heal and the patient promises to
130. id.
131. They may also have less inherent market power than hospitals.
132. Also, hospitals tend to provide more public goods in the form of undercompensated
essential services than do physicians. Cf Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24
YALE J. ON REG. 139 (2007) (documenting unprofitable services provided by hospitals).
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pay. There is an implied promise ... that the physician will refrain from
... conduct that is inconsistent with the "good faith" required of a fiduci-
ary. The patient should ... be able to trust that the physician will act in the
best interests of the patient thereby protecting the sanctity of the physician-
patient relationship.1
3
As Cardozo famously wrote, "Many forms of conduct permissible in a
workaday world for those acting at ann's length, are forbidden to those
bound by fiduciary ties." ' 34 Fiduciaries are "held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."'35
Courts have been skeptical of claims that hospitals are fiduciaries, 3 6 al-
though commentators have been more enthusiastic. 37 Still, a few courts have
held that hospitals have fiduciary duties to disclose medical errors to pa-
tients138 and not to exclude physicians unreasonably.9 Other courts have
declined to call hospitals fiduciaries but have refused to enforce waivers of
liability and (less often) mandatory arbitration provisions because of the
hospital's relationship to the vulnerable patient.'4" One California court, for
133. Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 961 (Il1. App. Ct. 1986). For description
and analysis of this body of law, see PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND
MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA 222-49 (2002); MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND
MORALS 179-211 (1993); and Maxwell J. Mehiman, Dishonest Medical Mistakes, 59 VAND. L. REV.
1137, 1147-49 (2006).
134. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
135. Id.
136. E.g., Sherwood v. Danbury Hosp., 896 A.2d 777, 797 (Conn. 2006) ("The plaintiff has
provided scant reason to conclude that a hospital owes a patient the duty of a fiduciary.").
137. E.g., Robert Gatter, The Mysterious Survival of the Policy Against Informed Consent
Liability for Hospitals, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1203, 1268 (2006) ("As hospitals have taken on
responsibilities to organize the delivery of health care to their patients, they enter into fiduciary
relationships with each of their patients as well... "); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contract-
ing: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PiTr. L. REV.
365, 366 n.6 (1990) ("Hospitals, as health care providers, must also fulfill the obligations imposed
by their fiduciary relationship with their patients.").
Some commentators also characterize health insurers as fiduciaries for certain purposes.
JACOBSON, supra note 133, at 222-49; Clifford A. Cantor, Fiduciary Liability In Emerging Health
Care, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 189, 212 (1997); Peter D. Jacobson & Michael T. Cahill, Applying Fidu-
ciary Responsibilities in the Managed Care Context, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 155 (2000).
138. These statements arise in the context of tolling the statute of limitations based on fraudu-
lent concealment. E.g., Keithley v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 698 P.2d 435, 439 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that a hospital's and physician's breach of its fiduciary duty to disclose medical information
to patients may toll the statute of limitations).
139. Silver v. Castle Mem'l Hosp., 497 P.2d 564, 570-71 (Haw. 1972) (asserting that "[a]
hospital occupies a fiduciary trust relationship between itself, its [physician] staff and the public it
seeks to serve"); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 824-25 (N.J. 1963) (explaining that a
hospital's authority to exclude physicians is "rightly viewed ... as [a] fiduciary power[] to be exer-
cised reasonably and for the public good"). Professor Dallon, however, questions this
characterization, noting that, in this context, patients do "not entrust hospitals with any confidential
information or property, nor does the hospital make decisions on behalf of the public. A hospital's
credentialing decisions are made based on the interests of the hospital itself." Craig W. Dallon,
Understanding Judicial Review of Hospitals' Physician Credentialing and Peer Review Decisions,
73 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 666 (2000).
140. MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 422-23 (7th ed. 2007).
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instance, acknowledged that "[t]o the ordinary person, admission to a hospi-
tal is an anxious, stressful, and frequently a traumatic experience ... [in
which the patient] normally feels he has no choice but to ... accede to all of
the terms and conditions for admission, including the signing of all forms
presented to him."'' 4' To believe otherwise would "require us to ignore the
stress, anxiety, and urgency which ordinarily beset a patient seeking hospital
admission."'
42
Generally, however, courts regard hospitals as ordinary commercial en-
terprises, and so courts sometimes say they may "conduct ... business
largely as [they] see[] fit.", However, courts have devised inventive ways to
oblige hospitals to provide treatment, like finding (on exiguous evidence)
that patients rely on a hospital's perceived assurance of treating people in
emergencies.' 44 Moreover, courts have curbed hospitals by attributing quasi-
public status to them. Thus when physicians challenge their exclusion from
hospital staffs, courts (in about half the states to consider the question) have
ruled that even private hospitals are, like the classic innkeepers and common
carriers, businesses affected with a public interest and therefore constrained
in their affairs. True, these cases address hospitals' obligations only to
doctors, not to patients. 46 But hospitals generally acknowledge public-
service obligations to patients, if only to gain the accreditation they need for
financial success. (Accredited hospitals need not treat patients without
charge, but they must accept patients with any form of payment-cash, in-
surance, Medicare, or Medicaid.) 14
In addition, courts relax normal contracting rules by enforcing doctors'
duty to treat even when patients do not promise to pay or even insist they
cannot pay.'4' The duty's scope is set largely by norms regarding patients'
rights and doctors' standard of care, 149 norms usually unalterable by
141. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 786 (Ct. App. 1976) (refusing to en-
force an agreement to arbitrate).
142. Id. at 789.
143. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 137 (Del. 1961).
144. See generally Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the Legal Duty to
Provide Emergency Care, 26 Hous. L. REV. 21 (1989).
145. See generally Dallon, supra note 139.
146. A rare exception is Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App. 1982), which consid-
ered whether a hospital may refuse to treat a disruptive patient. The court stated in dictum that a
hospital "is arguably in the nature of a 'public service enterprise,' and should not be permitted to
withhold its services arbitrarily, or without reasonable cause," but it declined to impose a duty to
treat because the argument had not been raised and because it was reluctant to impose on a single
hospital the burden of caring for such an onerous patient. Id. at 230; see also Stella L. Smetanka,
Who Will Protect The "'Disruptive" Dialysis Patient?, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 53 (2006).
147. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations requires, inter alia,
that hospitals accept patients without discrimination and regardless of their source of payment.
HALL ET AL., supra note 140, at 118.
148. ORDRONAUX, supra note 8, at 29; 23 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 62:12, 62:13, 62:15 (4th ed. 2002).
149. See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS (3d ed. 2004); GEORGE J.
ANNAS, STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN BIOETHICS (1993).
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contract. 5° Although physicians are not common carriers or in a public call-
ing,"' most of their legal obligations are similarly independent of any
contract.
There are even circumstances when courts arguably over-protect patients
in interpreting contracts. Courts regularly give patients relief when insurers
refuse to pay for treatments on the ground that the treatment was not medi-
cally necessary or otherwise not covered by the insurance contract.5 2 Some
commentators have argued that courts have too often interpreted such con-
tracts indefensibly out of sympathy for dangerously ill and dying
plaintiffs. 5'
In short, patients' vulnerability has long led courts to treat medical
transactions differently from ordinary commercial transactions. And in non-
economic spheres, the law specifically recognizes that patients' vulnerability
may lead them into poor decisions. For example, the doctrine of informed
consent acknowledges that patients follow their doctor's guidance in making
medical decisions: "The patient's reliance upon the physician is a trust of
the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated
with arms-length transactions. His dependence upon the physician for in-
formation affecting his well-being ... is well-nigh abject."' 54 Informed
consent seeks to protect ignorant and dependent patients by having doctors
equip them to make good decisions, even decisions that are not in the doc-
tor's interests.
55
In short, regulating markets and protecting consumers is a standard part
of law's agenda. Law specifically ameliorates the harshness of applying
commercial law to medical contracts in multiple ways. The logical exten-
sion of that work is to protect patients in an agonizing situation-when they
must shop in a merciless market and must incur unknown and uncontrolla-
ble obligations for intolerable sums.
But can courts do the job? One court doubted it could set a "reasonable
charge" for hospital services "without wading into the entire structure of
providing hospital care and the means of dealing with hospital solvency.'
'156
It could not "solve the problems of the American health care system, prob-
150. Tunkle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963); Mehlman, supra note
137.
151. However, a limited set of public service norms apply to physicians via the Americans
with Disabilities Act, which regards physicians' offices as places of public accommodation. See
Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (Va. 1977) (requiring physician to accept a blind patient with
a guide dog); Lois Shepherd, HIV, the ADA, and the Dut. to Treat, 37 Hous. L. REV. 1055 (2000);
Joel Teitelbaum & Sara Rosenbaum, Medical Care As A Public Accommodation: Moving The Dis-
cussion To Race, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 381 (2003).
152. Hall & Anderson, supra note 19.
153. See, e.g., id.; Richard S. Saver, Note, Reimbursing New Technologies: Why are the
Courts Judging Experimental Medicine?, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1095 (1992).
154. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted).
155. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996).




lems that the political branches of both the federal and state governments
and the efforts of the private sector have, thus far, been unable to resolve."'57
Similarly, in Pegram v. Herdrich,5 8 the Supreme Court concluded that any
line between good and bad insurance programs "would embody, in effect, a
judgment about socially acceptable medical risk."'59 However, that judgment
would "necessarily turn on facts to which courts would probably not have
ready access."' 6 Such "complicated factfinding and such a debatable social
judgment are not wisely required of courts unless for some reason resort
cannot be had to the legislative process, with its preferable forum for com-
prehensive investigations and judgments of social value, such as optimum
treatment levels and health-care expenditure."'
' 6
Deferring to markets and legislative policy made sense in Pegram, which
bluntly challenged a well-established feature of well-established policy-
for-profit physician-owned HMOs. However, nothing about managed care or
consumer-driven health care requires courts to ignore price-gouging. On the
contrary. Good private law is crucial to good markets, to ensuring that fair
contracts are fairly enforced. As Uwe Reinhardt observed, "forcing sick and
anxious people to shop around blindfolded for cost-effective care mocks the
very idea of consumer-directed care."'' 62 Legislatures that recruit markets to
reform health-care finance surely expect courts to help make the market
work.
B. How Can Courts Protect Patients? The Supervisory Doctrines
We have argued that the law needs to protect patients when providers
abuse their contractual power. Happily, courts command several doctrines
for supervising contracts. Courts can (1) fill in missing contract terms or
declare contracts void for vagueness, (2) amend or refuse to enforce uncon-
scionable contracts, and (3) evaluate the fairness of fiduciaries' behavior.
To be sure, courts deploy these supervisory doctrines cautiously because
they are rightly reluctant to disturb contracts. First, contract law assumes
people can bargain for themselves and know better than courts what they
need. Second, courts typically doubt their competence to evaluate the fair-
ness of contractual exchanges. Third, if courts often altered contracts,
contracts would lose their predictability and hence much of their value.
This is why the supervisory doctrines that allow courts to revise or reject
157. Id. Another court expressed a similar sentiment: "[Tlhe Georgia General Assembly[] [has
decided] to let market forces control health care costs in Georgia. It is outside of the role of this
Court to question the merits of this policy, and appellants' remedy for any perceived failures in this
scheme is with the legislature not the courts." Cox v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 631 S.E.2d 792,
797 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
158. 530 U.S. 211 (2000). This body of fiduciary law is created by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").
159. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 22 1.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Reinhardt, supra note 64, at 68.
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contracts set criteria that are not easily met. If those doctrines were not exi-
gent, they might too easily be extended to make too many contracts too
vulnerable.
It is thus not surprising that none of the supervisory doctrines precisely
and reliably can curb all the common abuses of medical contracting, as we
show in the following review of those doctrines and the case law and com-
mentary on them. Nevertheless, each doctrine speaks in direct and fruitful
ways to the problems in medical contracting we have described. Courts need
hardly do more than develop these doctrines to shield patients from the
worst excesses of medical pricing. That development should proceed as
common-law development usually does-as courts solve doctrinal and
valuation problems case by case. In what follows, we sketch each supervi-
sory doctrine and suggest ways in which that common-law process can
begin to deal with the epidemic of exploitative medical contracts.
1. Incomplete Contracts
As we have seen, a core problem with medical contracts is that they
rarely specify either rate or quantity. Faced with such a contract, courts can
(1) fill in the price or (2) conclude that the parties omitted an essential term
because they did not intend to be contractually bound.163 Common law pre-
ferred the second option, especially when contracts were deliberately
incomplete: "One of the core principles of contract law is the requirement of
definiteness. ' "' However, influenced by the Uniform Commercial Code and
the Restatement of Contracts, modem courts frequently use gap-filling con-
ventions, 6 especially for "relational" contracts or for subjects where
definiteness and completeness are elusive.' 66 For us, however, the important
point is that both approaches permit courts to protect vulnerable consumers,
since whether a court fills in the price or concludes that no contract was in-
tended, it can review the reasonableness of prices.' 67 If a contract is
unenforceable, quantum meruit requires patients to pay the reasonable value
of what they received. If a valid contract specifies no price, the implied price
must be reasonable.
163. See generally Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003).
164. Id. at 1643.
165. Omri Ben-Shahar, "Agreeing to Disagree": Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete
Contracts, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 389, 394.
166. Scott, supra note 163, at 1650, 1654-59. Such is the case for hospital contracts. See
supra text accompanying notes 64-66. Physician contracts, in contrast, are not "relational" in this
same sense (even though they govern a treatment "relationship"). Therefore, physician contracts are
more appropriately viewed as deliberately incomplete for the reasons of social and professional
norms and interpersonal psychology that Professor Scott discusses. Scott, supra note 163, at 1654-
59. To the extent that courts enforce both types of medical contracts despite their incompleteness,
this may be tacit judicial recognition of the relational features common to all medical encounters.
167. See, e.g., H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Rencare, Ltd., No. 04-03-00190-CV, 2004 WL
199272 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2004) (allowing a jury to reject a provider's justification for its usual
charges and to award a lower amount); Morreim, supra note 8, at 1257-59.
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Thus in Pychon v. Brewster, a colonial Massachusetts decision, a doc-
tor's executor brought a contract action for "a long Doctor's Bill for
Medicines, Travel into the Country and Attendance."' 68 The patient said the
action lay in quantum meruit, not indebitatus assumpsit, because the parties
had not set an exact sum. The court rejected the defense, since "Travel for
Physicians, their Drugs and Attendance, had as fixed a Price as Goods sold
by a Shopkeeper."'' 69 Nevertheless, the jury could (and did) reduce the
charges "to what they thought 'reasonable."' "7 0 And recently, Colomar v.
Mercy Hospital, Inc. held that the patient "stated a claim ... for unreason-
able pricing of an open pricing term" where the hospital allegedly charged
six times its cost for services.'
7'
So, where no contract exists or where a contract states no price, courts
can protect vulnerable patients by imposing a reasonable price. But can pro-
viders defeat such courts simply by raising the level of contractual
specificity-for example, by stipulating that patients must pay the providers'
"usual charges"? Here is an opportunity to develop the common law to pro-
tect exploited patients. Put simply, the higher the standard of specificity the
court demands, the more likely the contract is to fail, thus allowing the court
to insist on a reasonable price. A court might decide that a phrase like "usual
charges" is specific enough to put patients on notice of what they are con-
tracting to, and then the patient would have the daunting burden of showing
that the provider's price was unreasonable.' But in light of all we have said,
a court could better conclude that such calculatedly vague provisions give
patients no inkling of the risks they are assuming. This of course relieves the
patient of the burden of proving the provider's price unreasonable and per-
mits the court to decide what a reasonable price would be.
Many courts, however, think hospitals cannot reasonably be asked to be
more definite about uncertain charges. 1 For instance, Shelton v. Duke
168. Quincy 224, 224 (Mass. 1766).
169. Pychon, Quincy at 224.
170. Id. at 225 (emphasis omitted).
171. 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1273-74 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
172. See, e.g., Harrison v. Christus St. Patrick Hosp., 430 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (W.D. La.
2006) ("The term 'regular rates and terms of the hospital' does not create an open-ended contract.
Thus, no analysis of whether the charges were 'fair and reasonable' is required."); Burton v. William
Beaumont Hosp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 707, 719 (E.D. Mich. 2005) ("Regardless of whether Beaumont's
charges were reasonable, it is undisputed that plaintiffs have not paid the charges in full ... accord-
ing to the express and unambiguous contract language").
173. For example, one court stated:
The price term "all charges" is certainly less precise than price term of the ordinary contract
for goods or services in that it does not specify an exact amount to be paid. It is, however, the
only practical way in which the obligations of the patient to pay can be set forth .... Besides
handing the patient an inches-high stack of papers detailing the hospital's charges for each and
every conceivable service, which he or she could not possibly read and understand before
agreeing to treatment ....




University Health System 74 found "regular rates" specific enough to make a
contract enforceable, since medical costs are unpredictable and patients
cannot practically authorize each new cost. "For this reason, it is entirely
reasonable and predictable that patients would agree to pay the hospital's
regular rates for whatever services might be necessary ... ."' More, "the
rates of services contained in the 'charge master' were necessarily implied
in the contract"; therefore, "we need not address plaintiff's argument that
the rates charged by defendant were 'unreasonable'" under a quasi-contract
theory. 116
Somewhat less deferential is Doe v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee,
Inc.'77 The hospital sued to collect the uninsured twenty percent of the
$6,731 surgery bill and said its standard admissions form obliged the patient
to pay whatever its confidential charge master specified. The court declined
to enforce the contract because it referred indeterminately to "charges" and
not specifically to the charge master. On quantum meruit grounds, the hospi-
tal was entitled only to the reasonable value of its services based on its costs
and what other hospitals charged.
78
Doe is by itself flimsy precedent, since the hospital need only amend its
contract to incorporate the charge master specifically. And of course courts
have generally tolerated low levels of specificity in medical contracts. But
the failure of the market for medical care and the vulnerability of the pa-
tients buying care (facts which courts have not grasped) justify the small
step of requiring higher standards of clarity and specificity in these contracts
so that courts may review the reasonableness of the prices providers thrust
upon patients.
We have been discussing one supervisory doctrine that gives courts an
especially clear path to reviewing the reasonableness of prices. However,
this is not the only doctrinal basis for such reviews. To the other bases we
now turn.
The term "regular rates and terms of the hospital" does not create an open-ended contract.
Thus, no analysis of whether the charges were "fair and reasonable" is required. Pure common
sense demands the conclusion that it would be virtually impossible for a health care provider to
provide a complete list of every possible service to be rendered an emergency patient prior to
admission.
Harrison, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 595-96 (footnote omitted). Still another court said:
[Tihe plain language of the contract leaves the discretion to set the rates solely with [the hospi-
tal]. This reflects the practical reality that, in a hospital setting, it is not possible to know at the
outset what the cost of the treatment will be, because it is not known what treatment will be
medically necessary.
Cox v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 631 S.E.2d 792, 797 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (footnote omitted).
174. 633 S.E.2d 113 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
175. Shelton, 633 S.E.2d at 116.
176. Id. at 116-17.
177. 46 S.W.3d 191 (Tenn. 2001).




A second doctrinal basis for policing medical prices is the double-
barreled law of unconscionability. The first barrel, substantive unconscion-
ability, concerns the fairness of the contract's terms. Procedural
unconscionability concerns the fairness of the process by which the contract
was reached. Both aspects speak directly to the problems of medical con-
tracting we have examined and richly proffer materials for developing a
common law of fairness in medical contracts.
The heart of procedural unconscionability (and its sibling, duress) is that
patients who need care can hardly reject a provider's contract. 79 That com-
pulsion does not, by itself, make the contract unenforceable:180 if need alone
vitiated promises to pay, few medical contracts could be enforced, which
might undermine physicians' obligations to patients. 8" Therefore, courts
have scanted these doctrines in interpreting medical contracts, even in horri-
fying cases: The mother said, "I signed where she told me to sign, so they
would give [my son] medical treatment because he needed it because he was
bleeding out of his ears, out of his mouth, the bone out of his elbow was
sticking out through the skin."'' 8 2 The court replied that hospitals have not
"engaged in some form of wrongful conduct by asking [patients or families]
to sign the patient authorization agreement.' ' ... Patients "cannot seriously
argue that an agreement requiring them to pay for services that they admit-
tedly received and benefited from is unfair"'114 or "contrary to the[ir]
reasonable expectations"1 5 or that the patient "was under pressure greater
than that felt by any debtor."'
8 6
As this grisly example suggests, "the legal system often treats medical
debt like any other contract claim .... Contract law does not require actual
negotiation of the terms of a contract, and it generally enforces standard
forms drafted by one party. The fact that the terms are not extensively dis-
closed ordinarily will not defeat enforceability."' 87 A Georgia court, for
example, refused to evaluate a hospital's bills for uninsured patients, since
they were not "being charged anything other than what the hospital
179. See, e.g., Milford Hosp. v. Champeau, No. CV00069269S, 2001 WL 497110 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2001). When the patient's wife signed the agreement, her husband was having a
heart attack, and she believed her husband would not be treated if she refused to sign the agreement.
Id. at *5.
180. John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REv. 253, 283
(1947).
181. For instance, British barristers were once exempt from malpractice suits because they
had no contractual right to sue clients for their fees. Hall, supra note 8, at 163-64.
182. Heartland Health Sys., Inc. v. Chamberlin, 871 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
183. Milford Hosp., 2001 WL 497110, at *5.
184. Id. at *6.
185. Heartland Health Sys., 871 S.W.2d at 11.
186. Greene v. Alachua Gen. Hosp., Inc., 705 So. 2d 953, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
187. Jacoby & Warren, supra note 7, at 570 (footnote omitted); see also Batchis, supra note
114, at 529 ("[C]ourts are reluctant to grant [unconscionability] claims.").
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normally charges uninsured patients. ' After all, the "plain language of the
contract," which required payment "in accordance with the rates and terms
of the hospital," left "the discretion to set the rates solely "with the hospital."
There "can be no breach of an implied covenant of good faith where the
party to a contract has done what the provisions of the contract expressly
give him the right to do."
This demanding interpretation of procedural unconscionability is doctri-
nally defensible in most contractual situations, but it is indefensibly wooden
applied to medical contracts. Mere need, mere urgency, may ordinarily be
inadequate to justify invoking unconscionability, but medical contracts are
different. First, medical need can be urgent in a harshly more immediate,
cruelly more lethal sense than in the normal run of contracts for which
courts developed the doctrine of unconscionability. Second, the procedural
problems here go beyond mere urgency. Little about the process by which
patients "negotiate" with lordly and indifferent bureaucracies can be called
fair, and it is the whole process and the market in which it operates that
courts should consider in developing the common law of procedural uncon-
scionability.
Furthermore, the law of procedural unconscionability works jointly in
medical contracts with the law of substantive unconscionability. In other
words, the procedural and substantive aspects of unconscionability interact,
since the less fair the procedure the less reason we have to think the sub-
stance reflects a meaningful bargain between the parties. (Or, on another
view, the way a contract was negotiated matters little if the price charged is
fair.) It requires little development of substantive unconscionability to make
it useful in supervising medical contracts. We have lengthily shown that the
providers' prices for uninsured patients often have no basis in either the cost
of the service or in genuinely negotiated prices (the ones secured by insur-
ers). At some point-a point reached with disquieting regularity-such
prices go beyond mere unreasonability and become unconscionable.
In other areas, courts have done just what we advocate--deployed both
procedural and substantive unconscionability to prevent imposition'8 9 where
markets fail and one party takes abusive advantage of the other party's
weakness. For example, equity courts applying admiralty law in salvage and
rescue cases refuse to enforce promises to pay exorbitant fees for saving
goods or a ship in distress'90 when the promise is extracted from a captain
188. Cox v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 631 S.E.2d 792, 796 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
189. Imposition is a form of unconscionability that consists of taking unfair advantage of a
vulnerable situation by extracting a higher price than is fair. Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange Park,
661 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). A few courts have also ruled that unreasonable
medical pricing could constitute a violation of state unfair-trade-practice laws. Batchis, supra note
114, at 532.
190. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 118 (7th ed. 2007) ("[Tjhe corner-
stone of the admiralty rules of salvage [is] that the salvor is entitled to a reasonable fee for saving
the ship, but that a contract made after the ship gets into trouble will only be evidence of what that
reasonable fee is."); Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 757 ("[lIt is well established in admiralty law that a
contract for salvage services-that is, a contract to rescue a vessel or its cargo-is reviewable for
fairness of terms if entered into while the promisor is in distress.").
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who is "hopeless, helpless, and passive-where there [is] no market, no
money, no competition.""'9 That promise "has no characteristic of a valid
contract."'9' Invoking such precedents, authorities as diverse as Melvin
Eisenberg and Richard Posner call urgent medical care a paradigmatic case
for judicially imposing reasonable contractual terms.' 93 Similarly, Professor
Eisenberg thinks it "unconscionable for [any] merchant to exploit a con-
sumer's price-ignorance by offering a homogeneous commodity at a price
he knows or has reason to know" is "strikingly disproportionate to that at
which the commodity is normally sold in readily accessible market-
places."' 94
Thus the procedural unfairness of many medical contracts coupled with
a substantively unfair price might well justify a claim of unconscionability
or imposition as some courts have held.' 95 For example, in 1777, at the dawn
of contract law, a doctor treated a patient for "a fashionable [venereal] dis-
ease" in return for a note for £200. The doctor sued on the note while the
patient was in debtor's prison. 96 According to a newspaper report, Lord
Mansfield instructed the jury "with hot indignation," expressing "his disap-
probation of the doctor's conduct" 97:
He lamented the situation of the defendant who had spent his fortune and
seemed to have been bullied into the securities that were the object of con-
tention. He observed that men enervated by debauchery and vice wanted
spirit to prevent imposition; that the defendant seemed one of that kind as
the doctor's conduct had induced him to sign the draft and note of hand;
that it was his duty and that of the jury to rescue him if possible from de-
struction.' 98
In modem cases, unconscionability has been most successful where a
third person, like a family member, '99 volunteers in an emergency to pay an
191. Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 150, 159 (1857).
192. Id.
193. See POSNER, supra note 190, at 134-35; Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 761-62.
194. Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 780-81. The author notes that a "doctrine prohibiting the
exploitation of price-ignorance" is supported by cases striking down unconscionable prices in door-
to-door sales. Id. at 784.
195. E.g., Hill v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 06 C 1488, 2006 WL 3783415,
at *6 (N.D. 111. Dec. 20, 2006) (holding that a claim for unconscionability is stated when a hospital
billed an indigent patient $892.72 because it was "not supposed to charge indigent patients" and the
patient "had to agree to pay or forego necessary medical treatment"); see also Morreim, supra note
8, at 1247-48; Nation, supra note 8, at 124-31.
196. GAZETTEER & NEW DAILY ADVERTISER, June 18, 1777, quoted in Catherine Crawford,




199. Under the "necessaries" doctrine, spouses may be responsible for each other's medical
care and parents for the care of minor children. Jacoby & Warren, supra note 7, at 567-68. The
cases discussed here involve situations where this doctrine was not dispositive.
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adult's bills.2°° Yet the reasoning in those cases applies excellently to cases in
which patients themselves signed the contract. A New Jersey court, for in-
stance, declined to enforce a hospital contract where the patient's wife
signed a standard form that didn't describe the hospital's rates and was
"conspicuously silent on the question of balance billing."2 ° ' The form's
terms "were non-negotiable. The hospital clearly exercised a decisive advan-
tage in bargaining."2 2 "The patient was in no position to reject the proffered
agreement, to bargain with the hospital or, in lieu of agreement, to find an-
other hospital. 20' 3 The patient's treatment "was medically necessary and the
option of walking away from the deal was simply unrealistic.
'
204
Similarly, a New York court absolved an estranged husband from paying
for treating his separated wife's ectopic pregnancy, since he saw "himself as
powerless to do anything other than sign the form. A hospital emergency
room is certainly not a place in which any but the strongest can be expected
to exercise calm and dispassionate judgment. The law of contracts is not
intended to use 'superman' as its model., 205 This was "exactly the type of
situation in which a flexible application of the doctrine of inviolability of
contract is warranted to permit appropriate judicial compassion and under-
standing." 20 6
In sum, patients are often unfairly induced to sign unfair contracts with
undisclosed terms. Procedural and substantive unconscionability exactly
deal with such circumstances, and little development of the law is needed to
apply that law to medical contracts. Analogous developments have been
worked out in some comparable areas of law, and unconscionability princi-
ples have already been spottily applied to medical contracts. We suspect that
courts would apply those principles more broadly if they better understood
how the health-care market works.
3. Fiduciary Duty
The third set of legal ideas courts should develop to deal with abuses in
medical contracting is the law of the fiduciary. Doctors have undoubted fi-
200. In addition to the cases described in the following text, see Phoenix Baptist Hospital &
Medical Center, Inc. v. Aiken, 877 P.2d 1345, 1349-50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994), which absolved a
husband from paying for his wife's emergency care because he "signed the agreement under ex-
tremely stressful circumstances without having had the terms of the agreement explained to him,"
and "he felt he had no choice but to immediately sign the preprinted form," and Heartland Health
Systems, Inc. v. Chamberlin, 871 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993), which rejected an unconscion-
ability defense but stated in dictum that, "[i]f a stranger brought an accident victim to the hospital,
and signed a document whose terms, unnoticed by him, obligated him to pay the hospital bill, dif-
ferent considerations and different expectations would no doubt come into play if the hospital
sought to hold him liable for the hospital bill."








duciary duties to their patients, and fiduciaries must avoid or minimize
conflicts of interest with their clients. Fees create an obvious conflict of in-
terest, 2°s so must physicians minimize them? Normally, no,2°9 since "[w]ere
the duty of loyalty really to require fiduciaries to act exclusively in the inter-
ests of their beneficiaries, it would set a standard of conduct no one could
hope to meet."'210 Consequently, physicians' or hospitals' fiduciary duties
conventionally "relate only to the provision of care and not the payment
therefor.!'
'
207. See supra text accompanying notes 133-142. A fiduciary role is not as well established,
however, for hospitals or other care providers. Id.
208. When "lawyers set and then collect fees for their professional services, they inevitably
are involved in a conflict of interest between themselves and their clients .... [L]awyers have an
interest in receiving fees that must clash with the interest of clients in paying as little as possible." I
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODEs, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 8.2, at 8-5 (2003 &
Supp. 2005); accord Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, Can a Reasonable Doubt Have an Unrea-
sonable Price? Limitations of Attorneys' Fees in Criminal Cases, 41 B.C. L. REV. 1, 29 (1999)
("[T]here is an inherent conflict between an attorney's desire to earn as much as possible, and the
client's desire for excellent representation at the lowest possible cost.").
209. But cf Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of Scarce
Resources: Is There a Duty to Treat?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1993) ("[T]he courts virtually
without exception have rejected the proposition that patients and physicians should be allowed to
bargain over the terms of their relationship."). Elsewhere in his article, Prof. Mehlman recognizes
that
[t]he issues are not that simple .... For example, the physician certainly is permitted to accept
a fee from the patient. Yet the patient would arguably be better off if she could obtain the care
for free. By charging a fee, the physician might be said to be placing his own interests above
those of the patient. However, this does not necessarily constitute a violation of his fiduciary
duty.
Id. at 371.
210. Paul B. Miller & Charles Weijer, Fiduciary Obligation in Clinical Research, 34 J.L.
MED. & ETHIcs 424, 435 (2006).
211. DiCarlo v. St. Mary's Hosp., No. 05-1665, 2006 WL 2038498, at *9 (D.N.J. July 19,
2006); see also Wright v. Jeckle, 144 P.3d 301 (Wash. 2006) (finding that fiduciary duty is not
breached when a physician charges more than cost for a prescription drug). The only express hold-
ing to the contrary we are aware of is Greenfield v. Manor Care, Inc., 705 So. 2d 926, 932 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc. v. Knowles, 766
So. 2d 335 (Fla. App. 2000), which ruled that a nursing home has a fiduciary duty not to overcharge
a patient. See also Havsy v. Wash. Dept. of Health Bd. of Osteopathic Med. & Surgery, No. 53198-
1-I, 2004 WL 2153876, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2004) (upholding the decision of regulatory
agency (licensing board) that a physician "breached his fiduciary duty to [a patient] by failing to
inform [the patient] of the high cost of [a diagnostic test] and of the risk that [the patient's] insurer
might not cover the ... cost [of the test]").
Some courts suggest that providers must help patients obtain insurance reimbursement. E.g.,
Murphy v. Godwin, 303 A.2d 668, 673-74 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973) (finding a legal duty to assist
patient with completing insurance application forms); Ahnert v. Wildman, 376 N.E.2d 1182, 1186
(Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (suggesting in dictum that the same duty exists); Picker v. Castro, 776 N.Y.S.2d
433 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (finding the same duty); N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp. Goldwater Mem'l
Hosp. v. Gorman, 448 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (holding that a public hospital has an
obligation to assist patient in applying for Medicaid); cf Chew v. Meyer, 527 A.2d 828, 832 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (recognizing a physician's duty to help a patient obtain a paid absence from
work for health reasons). But these isolated decisions depend on narrow, not fiduciary, reasoning.
For instance, in Picker, a psychologist refused to help as a protest against the insurance industry,
even though the patient offered to pay the doctor's hourly rate for completing the paperwork. 776
N.Y.S.2d at 434. Gorman is based on a public hospital's statutory and corporate mission in relation
to the Medicaid program in particular. 448 N.Y.S.2d at 624. Other cases expressly reject any
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Several recent cases exemplify this response. A Michigan court rejected
an "attempt to stretch the logic of the fiduciary relationship that exists be-
tween a doctor and a patient to encompass a hospital's billing practices. 22
An Illinois court found "no fiduciary relationship between a hospital and its
patients with respect to billing practices.,, 213 A Georgia court found no "fidu-
ciary relationship between a hospital and a patient with respect to pricing,"
since the plaintiff could cite no precedent.1 4 Another Georgia court agreed:
"The mere fact that the [patients] ... alleged they personally reposed trust
and confidence in ... [the] nonprofit hospital does not show a confidential
or fiduciary relationship," since in most "business dealings, opposite parties
have trust and confidence in each other's integrity, but there is no confiden-
tial relationship by this alone.'2, 5 And while "New Jersey has recognized that
doctors owe a fiduciary duty to patients in making medical decisions, ...
and that nonprofit hospitals owe a fiduciary duty to the public with regard to
staffing decisions," a New Jersey court followed Georgia's rule because no,, 211
precedent "extended a hospital's fiduciary duty to its billing practices.
Nevertheless, doctors and hospitals sometimes exploit trusting patients
with exorbitant charges for essential care. The issue then is not whether the
provider has minimized its fees; it is whether the provider has charged un-
reasonable-indeed abusive-fees. The law at least acknowledges that kind
of reality in another professional context: attorneys may negotiate fees at
arm's length,2 7 but fees must be reasonable." 8 True, lawyers are rarely dis-
fiduciary-like duty. E.g., Mraz v. Taft, 619 N.E.2d 483 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding that nursing
home and hospital have no duty to advise patient he is eligible for Medicaid); see generally Arato v.
Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 608 (Cal. 1993) (emphasizing that a "physician is not the patient's financial
adviser" and rejecting an argument that a physician's fiduciary duty encompasses a patient's "busi-
ness and investment affairs" (quoting Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 n.10
(Cal. 1990))).
212. Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 707,724 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
213. Hill v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 06 C 1488, 2006 WL 3783415, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2006) (citing Burton, 373 E Supp. 2d at 723-24.
214. Cox v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 631 S.E.2d 792, 798 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
215. Morrell v. Wellstar Health Sys., Inc., 633 S.E.2d 68, 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
216. DiCarlo, 2006 WL 2038498, at *9 (citation omitted).
217. A comment to section 34 of the Restatement of the Law Goveming Lawyers states that
"clients and lawyers [are] free to negotiate a broad range of compensation terms." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. a (2000). Another comment states that "[i]n
general, clients and lawyers are free to contract for the fee that [the] client is to pay." Id. § 34 cmt. b;
see, e.g., Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying nor-
mal contract law to uphold written agreement with a large company to pay a one million dollar
contingency fee for a modest amount of legal work). An ABA task force, for instance, thought law-
yers "should not have any affirmative duty to disclose the existence or amount of negotiated non-
standard rates for other clients when quoting rates to a client." Task Force on Lawyer Business Eth-
ics, Statements of Principles, 51 Bus. LAW. 1303, 1317-18 (1996).
218. Chin & Wells, supra note 208, at 2 ("For as long as lawyers have been regulated, the law
has prohibited them from charging clients 'unreasonable' fees."); Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of
Lawyers' Contracts is Different, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 443, 494-95 (1998) (explaining that lawyers'
fee agreements can be reviewed for reasonableness).
The reasonableness of fees is usually evaluated, however, under a variety of specialized legal
regimes that are not based directly on fiduciary principles. For instance, courts have inherent author-
ity to police the ethics of lawyers who appear before them. Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137,
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ciplined for excessive fees "in the absence of some other form of miscon-
duct.'" 9 But the fiduciary principle applies to lawyers' fees, even if rather
weakly in practice.
If the fiduciary principle applies only weakly to lawyers' fees, should it
apply only weakly to medical bills? No. The situations differ in ways that
demand a stronger medical than legal fiduciary standard. First, the market
constrains lawyers' fees much better than doctors' fees. Second, unlike pa-
tients, clients can generally negotiate terms in advance. (Similarly, the law
often requires automobile mechanics2'0 and funeral directors 2 to warn con-
sumers what they'll be charged.) Far from insisting on advance negotiations,
medical law uses a hair-trigger test to decide whether providers have as-
sumed obligations to patients. Talking to, cursorily examining, or scheduling
222an appointment for a patient can initiate a doctor-patient relationship.
Medical law imposes professional responsibilities more quickly than the law
of lawyering because patients' needs are generally more urgent than clients'.
Doctors are fiduciaries because patients are medically at their mercy.
Unnegotiated, open-ended contracts make patients as vulnerable financially
as they are medically. Charging uninsured patients several times more than
patients protected by private insurers or government regulators flagrantly
exploits patients' financial, physical, and psychological vulnerability. Fidu-
ciary law is equipped with principles which cry out for application in such
circumstances. The Restatement (Second) of the Law of Agency provides
that if "the creation of the relation involves peculiar trust and confidence," a
fiduciary obligation may exist "prior to the employment and, if so, the agent
is under a duty to deal fairly with the principal in arranging the terms of the,,223
employment. For example, undisclosed, excessive markups in securities
sales constitute fraud because a broker is "under a special duty, in view of
its expert knowledge and proffered advice, not to take advantage of its
141 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that "in its supervisory power over the members of its bar, a court has
jurisdiction of certain activities of [its] members, including the charges of contingent fees"). Under
the bankruptcy statute, courts try to "keep the fee at a minimum in order that creditors of a bankrupt
may recoup a maximum of their losses." 2 STUART M. SPEISER, ATTORNEY'S FEES § 14:9 (1973). In
class action lawsuits, Rule 23(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires courts to allow
only reasonable attorney's fees in order "to protect the interests of the class members from abuse."
Dunn v. H. K. Porter Co., 602 F.2d 1105, 1109 (3d Cir. 1979). These principles confer on courts
especially "broad discretion to determine a reasonable figure" on account of the "equitable nature of
an award of attorney's fees from a common fund." 2 JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN, McLAUGHLIN ON
CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 6:23, at 6-96 (3d ed. 2006).
219. Chin & Wells, supra note 208, at 6.
220. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Automobile Repairman's Duty to Provide Customer with In-
formation, Estimates, or Replaced Parts, Under Automobile Repair Consumer Protection Act, 25
A.L.R. 4TH 506,507 (1983).
221. Funeral Industry Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 453.2 (2007); Michael R. Santiago, The Industry
of Death: Regulating Mortuary Services, 30 McGEORGE L. REV. 463,464 (1999).
222. See generally James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes Physician-Patient
Relationship for Malpractice Purposes, 17 A.L.R. 4TH 132 (1982).
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 390 cmt. e (1958). This position is
maintained in the current draft of the Restatement of the Law of Agency. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW OF AGENCY § 8.01 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2005).
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customers' ignorance of market conditions., 224 And classic fiduciary princi-
ples inhibit lawyers from changing fees during the representation. Such
changes are "subject to special scrutiny" and are voidable unless the lawyer
proves them "fair and reasonable to the client.2 25
Do the arguments for using fiduciary principles to supervise providers'
prices prove too much? Do they apply, for instance, to other medical goods
and services? Not necessarily. Nursing homes, for instance, operate in a
226market that functions reasonably well. Nor are drug companies good can-
didates for judicial supervision, despite their market power. 27 First, drug
companies are not fiduciaries but sell wares like any merchant.22 Second,
229
drug prices are readily stated and readily disclosed before purchase, so
that, unlike hospital prices, pharmaceutical prices reflect what many in-
formed purchasers will pay in arm's length transactions. Third, people rarely
make open-ended promises to pay for drugs; they pay on the spot. Plaintiffs
who wish to recover money paid must show impropriety (like actual duress
or fraud), not just unfair terms."3 Fourth, lower drug prices in other coun-
tries prove little about drug companies' misbehavior, since market, social,• 231
and regulatory conditions elsewhere are different. Finally, drug compa-
224. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943); see also Duker &
Duker, Exchange Act Release No. 2350, 6 SEC 386, 389 (Dec. 19, 1939) ("[A] dealer may not
exploit the ignorance of his customer to exact unreasonable profits resulting from a price which
bears no reasonable relation to the prevailing price."). Some of these cases are reasoned explicitly on
the basis of the fiduciary status of investment advisers. See NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER
LAW AND REGULATION § 2.01 [A] (2d ed. 1999).
225. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 18, at 153-56 (2000).
226. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
227. Pharmaceutical companies vary their prices severalfold depending on where and how
drugs are purchased, with the greatest variations occurring between the United States and other
countries, especially for patented drugs. PATRICIA M. DANZON, PRICE COMPARISONS FOR PHARMA-
CEUTICALS: A REVIEW OF U.S. AND CROSS-NATIONAL STUDIES (1999), available at
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/papers/154.pdf; Dawn Gencarelli, One Pill, Many Prices:
Variation in Prescription Drug Prices in Selected Government Programs, NAT'L HEALTH POL'Y F.
ISSUE BRIEF, Aug. 29, 2005, available at http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs-ib/IB807_DrugPricing-08-29-
05.pdf.
228. Common law never regarded pharmacies as public callings, and physicians could always
charge for medications even when law restricted them to honoraria for their own services. Crawford,
supra note 196, at 392-95, 406-07.
229. In our personal experience, pharmacies will take back prescription drugs if the customer
balks at the price after the prescription has been filled.
230. See Hall v. Humana Hosp. Daytona Beach, 686 So. 2d 653, 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that patients could no longer contest the reasonableness of a hospital bill when they
paid it after treatment was completed and there were no elements of duress).
231. Also, manufacturers say higher profits are necessary in the United States to permit them
to sell drugs affordably to underdeveloped countries. If true, this global pricing strategy could be a
socially progressive business strategy that courts should be loath to undermine. As Professor Epstein
vividly explains:
The key characteristic of all drug markets is high fixed costs for research and development and
low marginal costs for each additional product unit. Stated in its most graphic form, it may
take $1 billion to get the first pill to market, but only $1 dollar to get the second. A system that
wants all consumers to pay only the marginal cost of the pill that they consume works wonders
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nies' market power derives mainly from federal patent law, to which the
common law of contracts should defer.
4. A Larger View of the Supervisory Doctrines
We have discussed the supervisory doctrines separately, but they are
closely related and mutually reinforcing. They address a common prob-
lem-the inefficiency and injustice created when ordinary contracting
mechanisms have gone so far astray that powerful parties to a contract are
able to bargain unfairly and exact extortionate terms. Then the ordinary pre-
sumption of the regularity and reliability of contracts must be abandoned.
When, as here, that occurs in a new arena, the judicial task is to select from
the set of supervisory doctrines the combination that best rectifies the prob-
lem.
This is just what courts have done in an analogous situation. In recent
decades, family law has become more receptive to antenuptial contracts and
to separation agreements.232 Such contracts, however, are markedly more
worrisome than commercial contracts, and for reasons that speak to our
problem. First, marital contracts share with medical contracts the problem of
specificity. Marital contracts cannot specify all the terms they might need,
not least because the future is infinitely complex and greatly obscure. Sec-
ond, the close relationship between the contractors makes marital contracts
as unlikely as medical contracts to be negotiated at arm's length and as eas-
ily used by one party to exploit the other. Third, like medical contracts,
marital contracts are made between people who are in a special relationship
of trust-a confidential or fiduciary relationship-that places special duties
of fairness on the parties.
Lawmakers have responded to these problems with marital contracts in
two ways. 233 First, they have extended the supervisory doctrines notably be-
yond their standard commercial boundaries. Second, they have canvassed
the whole menu of supervisory doctrines and mixed and matched them to
the needs created by this change in the law of contract. They have, for ex-
ample, required that marital contracts be in writing, imposed onerous notice
and disclosure requirements, lightened the burden of showing procedural
unconscionability, creatively combined procedural and substantive uncon-
scionability, interpreted substantive unconscionability as requiring contracts
to include particular kinds of provisions, asked whether contracts were con-
scionable at the time of enforcement (instead of the usual time of
contracting), asked whether the parties were represented by counsel, re-
quired that separation agreements be incorporated into judicial divorce
for patients 2 through n. But who rushes to the head of the queue to pay $1 billion for the first
pill? No one-yet the firm that cannot sell the first pill will not produce the second.
Richard A. Epstein, Conflicts of Interest in Health Care: who guards the guardians?, 50 PERSP. IN
BIOLOGY & MED. 72, 81 (2007).
232. This story is told in Chapter Five of CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN
INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW (3d ed. 2006).
233. Id. at 395-511.
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decrees, and so on at ingenious length. 34 Compared with this full-court
press, the proposals we have made for supervising medical contracts are
modest indeed.
Finally, we should recall that courts long ago regulated prices of "public
callings" and businesses "affected with a public interest" (like common car-
riers) which had elements of monopoly power."' Now, administrative
236
agencies generally do this work, but no such agency protects patients.
Consequently, as the Supreme Court said of public utilities in 1876, "in mat-
ters which do affect the public interest ... courts must determine what is
reasonable.' '23 Amen.
5. Determining Reasonable Rates
Our winding path through the supervisory doctrines suggests several
possibilities for holding providers to justifiable prices. But how should
courts evaluate the reasonableness of medical fees? Again, the short answer
is that courts have doctrines at hand which can be fitted to the task in the
usual common-law way. Certainly, determining reasonableness is well
within judicial experience and competence. Valuation is a pervasive judicial
function; tort and contract cases routinely present damage issues quite as
challenging. 23' Nor are these valuation problems unduly dependent on elu-
sive legislative, social, or "polycentric" facts.
234. Id.
235. BRUCE WYMAN, THE SPECIAL LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS 3
(1911). Although doctors no longer are regarded as being in a public calling, they once were, and
hospitals still are in many states. Moreover, several elements of doctors' legal obligations echo the
law of public callings. See supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
236. Some states once regulated hospitals like public utilities, but now only Maryland does.
See Anderson, All-payer Rate Setting, supra note 119, at 35-36.
237. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876). Another Supreme Court case echoed this
sentiment:
[l]t has always been recognized that, if a carrier attempted to charge a shipper an unreasonable
sum, the courts had jurisdiction to inquire into that matter and to award to the shipper any
amount exacted from him in excess of a reasonable rate; and also in a reverse case to render
judgment in favor of the carrier for the amount found to be a reasonable charge....
•.. There is nothing new or strange in this. It has always been a part of the judicial func-
tion ....
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 397, 399 (1894); see generally WYMAN, supra
note 235, at 1232.
238. Indeed, courts routinely determine the reasonableness of medical expenses in calculating
damages in personal injury suits. John Dewar Gleissner, Proving Medical Expenses: Time for a
Change, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 649, 649 (2005) ("Current legal procedures and practices ... in
tort cases typically involve obtaining testimony from treating physicians concerning the necessity
and reasonableness of healthcare charges."); see generally L.C. Di Stasi, Jr., Annotation, Necessity
and Sufficiency in Personal Injury or Death Action, of Evidence as to Reasonableness of Amount
Charged or Paid for Accrued Medical, Nursing, or Hospital Expenses, 12 A.L.R. 3D 1347 (1967).
239. Nation, supra note 8, at 135-36 (rejecting courts' concern over regulating prices because
they can refer to the average that a hospital receives from insurers as an objective, market-
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A court's theory of reasonableness and a case's procedural posture will
shape a court's evaluation of medical fees. Current doctrine gives us some
guidance. If the contract specifies a price, the patient usually must show it is
unreasonable or unconscionable. Where the price is open or implied, or a
contract is absent or unenforceable, the provider usually must show the rea-
sonableness of its prices, especially if the provider is the plaintiff.2"
Providers often meet these burdens easily, at least by making a prima fa-
cie case that shifts the burden to the patient.2 4' At a minimum,
reasonableness means the provider is not charging more than its usual
price.242 Showing that requires more than producing a bill, 24' but an adminis-
trator's testimony that the services were actually provided and that the
provider charged its usual fees usually suffices.2" Where a fiduciary duty
has been breached, however, providers may be under a greater burden to
show that their usual charges are fair and reasonable. 245
Scholars offer several theories of reasonableness. Presumably, as Profes-
sor Eisenberg suggests, definitions should be "closely related to the manner
in which the relevant market deviates from a perfectly competitive mar-
ket. 246 Professor Eisenberg prefers a liberal definition to reward and
encourage medical progress and to "include an appropriate share of the cost
of developing and maintaining rescue capacity. '247 In contrast, Professor
Ben-Shahar contends that in incomplete contracts of all kinds, "reasonable-
ness" should be set conservatively because that more accurately
approximates the payor's expectations and encourages the payee to
determined price); cf Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
394 (1978) (discussing "polycentric" problems that are ill-suited to adjudication).
240. E.g., Culverhouse v. Jackson, 194 S.E.2d 585, 586 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); Victory Mem'l
Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117, 119 (I11. App. Ct. 1986); H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Rencare, Ltd., No.
04-03-00190-CV, 2004 WL 199272, at *4-5 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 4,2004).
241. Wash. County Mem'l Hosp. v. Hattabaugh, 717 N.E.2d 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) ("Once
a prima facie case is established on an account, the burden of proof shifts to the account debtor to
prove that the claimed amount is incorrect.") (citing Auffenberg v. Bd. of Trs. of Columbus Reg'l
Hosp., 646 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Heartland Health Sys., Inc. v. Chamberlin, 871
S.W.2d 8, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that, once the hospital presents evidence that the overall
bill was generally reasonable, "the burden of challenging any particular item or items was upon the
defendants").
242. See, e.g., Sherman Hosp. v. Wingren, 523 N.E.2d 220, 222 (I11. App. Ct. 1988).
243. Victory Mem'l Hosp., 493 N.E.2d at 119-20; see Culverhouse, 194 S.E.2d at 586; Majid
v. Stubblefield, 589 N.E.2d 1045, 1048-49 (I11. App. Ct. 1992). Contra Wash. County Mem'l Hosp.,
717 N.E.2d at 933 ("Statements of charges for medical, hospital, or other health care expenses for
diagnosis or treatment ... shall constitute prima facie evidence that the charges are reasonable.")
(quoting IND. R. EvID. 413).
244. E.g., Majid, 589 N.E.2d at 1048-49; Sherman Hosp., 523 N.E.2d at 222-23; Victory
Mem "l Hosp., 493 N.E.2d at 119-20; Heartland Health Sys., 871 S.W.2d at 11; Doe v. HCA Health
Servs. of Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191,198-99 (Tenn. 2001).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 217-219.
246. Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 754.
247. Id. at 761-63. His "Desperate Patient" hypothetical posits a $300,000 fee for a new life-
saving operation. Without a large incentive, the physician may be unwilling to invest in innovation,
but prices can be set so high that too much is invested in unrewarding innovation.
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compromise.2 48 And Professors Ayres and Gertner want to consult efficiency,
fairness, and administrability in tailoring a range of default rules to particu-
lar circumstances.249
In practice, courts primarily ask (1) what the provider usually charges
for the service and (2) what other providers usually charge. One court held
that charges below the seventy-fifth percentile of what other hospitals
charge (a standard many insurers use to determine whether prices are
"usual, customary, and reasonable")210 is "'within the range' of the overall
market" as a matter of law."' The providers' burden of proof is light; they
rarely need cite empirical studies of prices; it usually suffices if a provider's
staff asserts vague familiarity with conditions in the local or similar mar-
252 253kets or, occasionally, regional or national markets .
The second approach-asking what the provider charges other pa-
tients-is trickier than it might appear, especially for hospitals, because they
must justify the chasm between patients with and patients without insur-
ance. Some courts say providers are not bound by the discounted prices they
accept from insurers. A New York line of cases holds that the "fact that
lesser amounts for the same services may be accepted from commercial in-
surers or government programs as payment in full does not indicate that the
amounts charged to defendant were not reasonable. 54
This is bad law and bad policy. It is bad law because these cases rest on
a misreading of a precedent that is not on point."' It is bad policy because
248. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 165. For medical care, this would usually mean what Medi-
caid pays.
249. lan Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). For instance, default rules could be set to mimic the par-
ties' probable intent or what most others actually agree to, or default rules could systematically favor
or disadvantage one or the other parties for strategic reasons, to reward or penalize undesired behav-
ior. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49(2)
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (outlining four possible measures of benefit); Symposium, Default
Rules in Private and Public Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 557 (2006).
250. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
251. Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
252. Majid v. Stubblefield, 589 N.E.2d, 1045, 1049 (111. App. Ct. 1992) (rejecting comparison
to prices in bigger and distant cities); Victory Mem'l Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117, 120 (I11. App.
Ct. 1986) (approving testimony based on a survey of area hospitals); Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of
Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191, 193 (Tenn. 2001) (citing with approval decisions that base reasonable
prices on "similar charges of other hospitals in the community").
253. E.g., Eagle v. Snyder, 604 A.2d 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that local pricing was
not reliable because the plaintiff specialists were the only physicians who did back surgeries in the
area).
254. Huntington Hosp. v. Abrandt, 779 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (App. Term 2004); accord Kolari v.
N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 382 F. Supp. 2d 562, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[U]nder New York law a
hospital's charges to an uninsured patient are not unreasonable merely because a lower price is
charged to government programs or other insurers."); Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp. v. Huberty, 428
N.Y.S.2d 746 (App. Div. 1980).
255. They rely on Flushing Hospital & Medical Center v. Woytisek, 364 N.E.2d 1120, 1121-
22 (N.Y. 1977), in which the reasonableness of the hospital's normal charge was not at issue. Rather
the issue was whether, under the insurance contract, the patient's coinsurance obligation was based
on the hospital's full charge rather than the insurer's negotiated discount. After examining the con-
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ignoring prices charged insured patients ignores the market-failure problems
we have described. An industry cannot make obscene price differentials
right simply by making them common. As health economist Gerard
Anderson told Congress, for "a price list to be reasonable it needs to reflect
what is actually being charged in the market place." And since "virtually no
public or private insurer actually pays full charges, charges are an unrealistic
standard for comparison. A more realistic standard is what insurers actually
pay and what the hospitals have been willing to accept.
' ' 6
Realizing this, several courts measure market prices by hospitals'
257
agreements with insurers. Temple University Hospital v. Healthcare Man-
agement Alternatives, Inc. 5 defined reasonable as the average amount the
hospital received from all payers for each service. River Park Hospital v.i- 259
BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee more vaguely defined reasonable as
something between the hospital's full charges and its negotiated discounts.
Similarly but more concretely, Professor Anderson sets "reasonable" at
twenty-five percent over what Medicare pays (roughly ten percent higher
than what private insurers pay). 6 He argues that using Medicare rates to
determine reasonableness is grounded in the marketplace because that ap-
proach is simple and transparent and is the method of many negotiated
managed-care contracts.
In sum, reasonable medical prices can be defined in several ways on
several theories, and courts have begun to work out standard approaches.
But this problem is not best resolved in one a priori burst of one-size-fits-all
theory.26 These are routine doctrinal, evidentiary, and procedural problems
courts can comfortably handle in the usual case-by-case way. They should
do so, as they have done in other areas where the law requires valuation.
tract, the court held that the patient was "not entitled to derive any economic benefit from this inde-
pendent [contractual] arrangement between the hospital and Blue Cross." Id. at 1122.
Another contrary line of cases arises in the context of personal injury damages. These courts
charge tortfeasors the full list prices for treating injured victims, despite the substantial discounts
providers might give the victims' health insurers. Michael K. Beard, The Impact of Changes in
Health Care Provider Reimbursement Systems on the Recovery of Damages for Medical Expenses in
Personal Injury Suits, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 453 (1998); Natalie J. Kussart, Casenote, Paid Bills
v. Charged Bills: Insurance and the Collateral Source Rule Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847
(2005), 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 151 (2006). These are not contractual disputes, however, and they are
informed by the special concerns of making tortfeasors pay the full costs of injuries they cause.
256. Anderson Testimony 2006, supra note 64, at 106, 109.
257. In addition to the cases discussed in text, see Valley Hospital v. Kroll, 847 A.2d 636, 651
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003) (holding that amount paid by Medicare establishes the reasonable
rate).
258. 832 A.2d 501, 508-09 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
259. 173 S.W.3d 43, 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
260. Anderson Testimony 2006, supra note 64, at 110-11. This formula avoids the objection,
accepted by one California court, Prospect Medical Group, Inc. v. Northridge Emergency Medical
Group, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456 (Ct. App. 2006), that Medicare rates might be unreasonably low or that
the range of reasonable pricing might extend above its levels.
261. For instance, courts might adopt different approaches for physicians than for hospitals, or
for specialists than for primary care physicians, since their market dynamics and price contracting
are different. Also, hospitals have more public-goods aspects, but physicians are more readily char-




Patients have always feared medical bills. For years-for decades-
health costs have been blazing upward, and today almost anyone can face
lethal bills from doctors and hospitals, bills that can shatter one's economic
health. 26' Attempts to control health costs have changed not only how care is
paid for; they have changed what it means to be a patient. Both managed
care and consumer-directed health care have propelled many people along
the continuum from patient to consumer and have made the market in which
the consumer shops unprecedentedly perilous.
The law has neither fully recognized nor adequately responded to the
change from patient to consumer or the changes in the market in which
these consumers shop. Instead, the law has dumped patients obliviously into
its default category: that of conventional consumers in a commercial market
who contract with vendors at arm's length and whose contracts are enforced
even when prices are wholly unspecified and demonstrably unjustifiable.
This is the wrong category. The standard "freedom of contract" view
works dreadfully in the medical context. Patients are not conventional con-
sumers. They are strangers in a strange land, vulnerable because they are
sick and because the market for health care is incomprehensible and danger-
ous. In their need, patients build relationships of dependence and trust with
the people who care for them. That justifies courts in deploying contractual
supervisory doctrines to set heightened standards of good faith and fair deal-
ing, standards that give patients a remedy when providers set unreasonable
fees in unreasonable ways. More specifically, the law should protect finan-
cially vulnerable patients when they are compelled to sign contracts that
commit them to paying whatever the provider eventually asks and when the
provider's charges are unrelated to its costs or its charges to insured patients.
While judicial supervention is necessary, while it offers some hope to
some people who sorely need it, we do not imagine that even the most ambi-
tious courts can come near to protecting consumer-patients sufficiently.
Ultimately, the dilemma of the patient as consumer is created by a problem
to which solutions are few, obscure, and elusive-the problem of controlling
health care costs while providing decent care for everyone.
Our primary purpose has been to solicit judicial succor for patients who
have been especially badly used by providers, not to propose large changes
in large systems. However, the systemic consequences of our proposals are
unlikely to be harmful and may be modestly beneficial. Since providers col-
lect far less from the uninsured than they charge, abating charges might
affect providers relatively little. If providers do feel some pressure to mod-
erate their charges to the uninsured, they might have somewhat more
incentive to find sound ways to control their costs.
As we suggested earlier, if judicial protection of consumers makes the
medical market work better, it should make consumer-directed health care
work better. On the other hand, our data and our arguments also suggest the
262. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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daunting difficulties of making consumer-directed health care work at all.
We have demonstrated that the market for uninsured health care works dis-
astrously and that the disaster is inextricably rooted in the nature of illness,
the patient, and the doctor-patient relationship. We see little in consumer-
directed health insurance that can change any of these timeless aspects of
health care.
Judicial protection of patient-consumers will hardly make the market-
place safe for patients who are responsible for their own medical bills. But
the fact that judicial protection cannot do everything does not mean it should
do nothing. That argument would prove far too much. Few ill-used parties to
a contract and few victims of torts sue, much less win; judicial remedies are
always a last resort and always leave many injured people uncompensated.
But courts can help patients fallen prey to predatory pricing in a perilous
market, and they should.
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